The previous worry was this. Those who use narrative analysis
in qualitative social science (let’s call them ‘narrative theorists’ and the
approach ‘narrative theory’ for speed) seem to be tempted by two claims either
one of which may be true but probably not both. They often stress the ubiquity of narratives
(“Even a conversation at a bus-stop is a narrative”). But they also chart the
internal structure of narratives (“All narratives have a moral” “There is always a Trickster”). It seems – albeit
contingently – highly unlikely both are true. The more the interesting claims
about the internal structure of narratives (eg the division into say seven
elements of any narrative), the less likely that narratives are ubiquitous or
of universal application to apparently non-narrative social situations (eg all
conversations at bus-stops). One would expect, rather, it to be true of
particular literary genres. The more the appeal to universal application, the
less likely that all utterances in social situations form a narrative with a
particular internal structure. My entirely informal survey of discussions with
narrative theorists (not at UCLan, I hasten to add) is a fondness, nevertheless, for both
claims.
The new worry – which is less straight forward and may be
unfounded – goes something like this. If narrative theory really charts
interesting and contingent aspects of the structure of the utterances of social
science subjects then it contrasts with, say, a grammar theorist’s view. A
theory of the grammar of a language – a grammar – is a sizeable achievement. But
it does not provide an insight into the content of utterances: just the linguistic
vehicles for expressing them. By contrast, the narrative theorist says things
like ‘every narrative has seven elements:...’, which could obviously be false.
If what makes the grammarian’s claims true is the structure of English, say, or
the structure of English as spoken in C21 Preston, or the innate structure of
human depth grammar, what would make the narrative theorists claims true?
Here is a thought. What they chart, intellectually riskily
like any brave social scientist, are the contingent social practices of, say,
C21 conversational participants. We can imagine the participants in contemporary Preston initially explicitly following some rules of good style in the way that one might follow
the rules of haiku or lipogram construction and then this becoming second
nature. The narrative theorists chart these conventions. But now suppose that we are interested in the views of wellbeing expressed by these subjects in conversations and that we ask them. If we attend to the form of the narrative (every narrative has a
moral; every narrative has seven elements:..) that they offer in reply we run two related risks.
First, we will be examining not the structure of the subjects’ conception of wellbeing but rather the structure of their conversational engagement and that is looking in the wrong place. Second, if we do not realise this and set out the structure of what results (the moral; the seven elements etc) we run the risk of thinking that their conceptions of wellbeing are in some way narratively structured when in fact it is merely a contingent way of giving them expression. (Imagine that we investigate two groups who reply on two different kinds of narrative to set out their conceptions of wellbeing. Have they distinct conceptions of wellbeing or the same conception undergoing different conventional forms of expression?) The way to avoid this is to model narrative structure on grammatical structure. But if so, the substantive claims about narrative structures will be undermined.
First, we will be examining not the structure of the subjects’ conception of wellbeing but rather the structure of their conversational engagement and that is looking in the wrong place. Second, if we do not realise this and set out the structure of what results (the moral; the seven elements etc) we run the risk of thinking that their conceptions of wellbeing are in some way narratively structured when in fact it is merely a contingent way of giving them expression. (Imagine that we investigate two groups who reply on two different kinds of narrative to set out their conceptions of wellbeing. Have they distinct conceptions of wellbeing or the same conception undergoing different conventional forms of expression?) The way to avoid this is to model narrative structure on grammatical structure. But if so, the substantive claims about narrative structures will be undermined.
(This worry parallels a worry about the relationship of the
conceptually structured realm of appearance and the underlying noumenal realm
on a two world reading of Kant. Once the noumenal realm is part of a composite
picture, the process of conceptualising it in one way (rather than another) looks
to be distorting of what is really real. One needs to think that the structure is not a substantive mediation but merely a way of letting the reality shine through.)
