Coda to my epistemology module

I have just come to the end of teaching an epistemology module (just a revision session to go). More so than other subjects I teach, at the end of the module, no particular analysis of knowledge and no particular response to scepticism seems totally compelling. The concept of knowledge seems particularly resistant to analysis. My attempt to frame a overall view - and to grapple with why it is so tricky - focuses on five key questions.

1: What more is there to knowledge than true belief?

Epistemology starts with the extra content to the concept of knowledge over and above true belief. (I am ignoring, without argument, the thought that knowledge and belief are incompatible because to say ‘I believe that p’ implies that one does not know it. But it does seem to me that this has more to do with pragmatics than semantics.) But why is there excess  content to knowledge?

After all, mere true belief gets one what one wants. Eg. I want a coffee and I believe that there is coffee in the café. The truth of this belief (and subsidiary related beliefs) is what enables me to satisfy that want.

But: mere true belief is insufficient for knowledge. Knowledge can be undermined by luck. This seems to be a pre-philosophical datum. But recognising that isn’t the end of the issue. We can ask ‘why?’, what is the point of the concept? Edward Craig is a rare philosopher who asks this question but whether his hypothesis of knowledge’s purpose can be independent of a prior grasp of what knowledge is is moot.

2: Is scepticism natural?

(Natural by contrast with artificial / an artefact.)

We do not normally take any account of sceptical possibilities ie. it is normally correct / appropriate to ascribe everyday knowledge independent of them.

But, also and normally, a change of context can undermine a knowledge ascription. Eg the revelation that Smith has a local twin undermines the claim that we know Smith is in town. Unless, that is, we also have a way of distinguishing the twins. 

Scepticism seems to grow from the way the context of a claim to know can suggest ringers both:

i) relative to evidence so far (the twins) and

ii) relative to all possible evidence (brain in a vat).

If scepticism is merely implicit in this structure, a natural implication of it, ie if there is no difference of kind between i) and ii), then scepticism is natural.

So both Wittgenstein and Williams attempts to undermine the sceptical ringers, specifically.

Wittgenstein suggests that we do not understand them as they threaten the preconditions for the language game of ascribing and claiming knowledge and doubt.

Williams argues that the sceptical ringer depends on the idea of ‘knowledge as whole’ which presupposes a false theory of knowledge (cf Bacon on heat).

2b: If scepticism is natural, can it be reconciled with everyday knowledge ascriptions?

Nozick: concedes that we do not know that sceptical hypotheses are not true but denies that this has implications for everyday knowledge. For Nozick this follows from his tracking conception of knowledge.

But it seems odd to maintain everyday knowledge in the face of active contemplation of an undefeated sceptical ringer.

American contextualists such as DeRose and Cohen argue that everyday knowledge ascription is correct in our everyday context but that that scepticism changes the context. There, we do not know that sceptical ringers are not true.

But it is hard not then to think that the everyday context is simply ignoring a possibility that should be taken into account.

Preliminary conclusion to question 2:

Either concede that scepticism trumps everyday knowledge and convict everyday ascription of error,

Or deny that scepticism is natural. But if so, we need to know why, and we need to know why it isn’t natural before the sceptical argument is off the ground.

3: Can ‘knowledge’ be analysed?

A dilemma:

·         The analysis begs the question by assuming notions a grasp of which follows that of knowledge.

·         The analysis would be substantive but is not sufficient for knowledge.

The second horn applies to reductionist accounts of knowledge.  But the dilemma as a whole applies applies to the Justified True Belief account in the face of Gettier cases. Gettier presents his cases as of JTB but nevertheless insufficient for knowledge (the second horn). One response is to argue that Smith is not, in fact, justified in his beliefs. But this threatens to equate our understanding of justification with whatever is sufficient (combined with true belief) for knowledge.

So could 'knowledge' be a basic concept? And if so, what does that do to epistemology?

A concept may be complex, in the sense that its philosophical elucidation requires the establishing of its connections with other concepts, and yet at the same time irreducible, in the sense that it cannot be defined away, without circularity, in terms of those other concepts to which it is necessarily related. (Strawson 1992, 22-3)

4: Is the quest for generality the problem?

Consider the problem for reliabilism that a method must be reliable (eg, not less than 100% else luck undermines knowledge and also not merely 100% but by luck, so, perhaps, 100% in this and nearby pws).

But no general method can be that reliable. Even perception of medium sized objects from close by  in afternoon light is not that reliable. But in this context, looking at that apple juice carton, there may be no possibility of error. So could local context, rather than general method, be the right response to the worry about luck?

Why might general analysis be difficult? Perhaps it has to do with the connection between knowledge and other possibilities that might have been.

5: Is knowledge natural*?

*Where natural = part of nature, this world.

The cat is on the mat in this world, whatever the relation of cat and mat in other possible worlds (pws).

But whether Smith knows that the cat is on the mat depends not just on her relation to that fact in this world, but also in some other pws.  If it had not been, she would not have believed it. (Or, in nearby pws where it is not on the mat, she does not believe that it is.)

We may, with McDowell, want to say that although the capacity to have knowledge is fallible, when all goes well, Smith does know that p. This connects to what McDowell says about perception: when all goes well, Smith is directly experiencing the fact that p even though, in other cases, she can be mistaken. Perception is a disjunction: either a genuine seeing (of the cat on the mat) or a mere appearance.

But unlike ‘directly experiencing’, knowing seems to depend on what might have been, not just what is. For knowledge, the difference between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ disjuncts is not just what actually obtains but what might have been.

(The contrast is made more complicated by the fact that an analysis of perception in either causal or counter-factual terms also presupposes how things would have been in other cases. If Smith sees that p then had p not been the case then, all other things being equal, Smith would not have had the experience as of p. But in the case of knowledge, the other possibilities, and hence the range of potential ringers, seems particularly badly behaved.)

But the lack of a plausible, non-circular, general account of the possibilities that need to be taken into account, the extra content of knowledge over true belief, makes the prospects of a general analysis of knowledge dim and throws attention back on particular circumstances. Hence epistemology helps unpack some of our commitments here and the connections between knowledge, justification, luck, etc but does not offer a reductive account of the concept in general terms.

Conference (London) Defensible in Theory and Workable in Practice

Is there are conception of autonomy that is:

Defensible in Theory and Workable in Practice

15-16 March 2013

Institute of Philosophy, London

Are any conceptions of autonomy defensible in theory and workable in practice? At the Essex Autonomy Project, this has been a key question animating our work. In this international conference — the culmination of our major programme of events — we intend to address it head on with contributions from philosophers, lawyers, psychiatrists and other practitioners. Among the issues to be discussed will be philosophical disputes about theories of autonomy, developments in mental health and capacity law, and autonomy in the context of eating disorders. A debate between Gordon Ashton (District Judge and Court of Protection) and Genevra Richardson (Professor of Law, Kings College London) will also be held, exploring the contested implications of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for reform of regimes of legal capacity.

Speakers: John Adlam, Michael Bach, Paul Benson, Derek Bolton, Fabian Freyenhagen, Wayne Martin

Participation is free, but seating is limited: advanced registration is required. To register please visit the website: http://autonomy.essex.ac.uk

The Essex Autonomy Project

UCLan conference on René Girard: politics, violence and the sacred

POLITICS, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED:

Exploring René Girard’s thought in Security and International Studies

University of Central Lancashire, UK

23-24 May 2013

“Order in human culture certainly does arise from an extreme of disorder, for such disorder is the disappearance of any and all contested objects in the midst of conflict, and it is at such a point that acquisitive mimesis is transformed into conflictual mimesis and tends toward the unification of conflict against an adversary.”

René Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World

RATIONALE

René Girard (1923) is arguably one of the most important scholars of our time. His corpus of reflections on religion, violence and mimetic theory has been acknowledged as one of the most striking approaches to human culture ever presented, to the point that it has been argued that his work has changed forever “the way we think about who and where we are” (Philosophy and Literature). In recent years, his thought has been studied and explored in many academic fields, including anthropology and literature, philosophy and sociology, history and psychology. These studies have generated a number of Girard-inspired research engagements and projects as witnessed by the creation ofThe Colloquium on Violence & Religion (COV&R) and Imitatio. Despite the strong assonance between Girardian themes and contemporary international issues and security challenges, scholars have not yet explored the implications of Girardian ideas for Security and more broadly International Relations.

The aim of the Conference is bring together a range of scholars in international relations, security, social and political theory which may develop a multidisciplinary engagement with René Girard’s work and its relevance for contemporary International Studies. A Special Issueof a journal and/or an edited volume is also envisaged as an outcome of the event.

Keynote Speakers includes:

Dr Michael Kirwan, Head of Theology, Heythrop College, University of London and author of Girard and Theology (New York & London: Continuum, 2009); Discovering Girard (London: Darton, 2004)

Dr Scott Thomas, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Bath, and author of The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)

We invite potential participants from across these disciplines to submit abstracts of no more than 250 words by February 15^th 2013drawing upon, but not limited to, such issues as:

THEORY

The relation between violence, the sacred and the “political”

Comparisons between Girard’s thought and that of other classical thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, Carl von Clausewitz, Reinhold Niebuhr, Carl Schmitt, Max Weber, Hans Morgenthau, George Bataille, Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben

Religion, sovereignty and the sacrality of borders

The international system and the “mimetic” balance of power 

The transcendence/immanence split and political mediation

Christendom, political theologies and the origins of modernity

War, peace and the victimization process

Biopolitics and the sacrality of violence

ISSUES AND CASE STUDIES

“Mimetic rivalry” and foreign policy

Fundamentalisms, extremisms and the scapegoat theory

Terrorism, human security and “sacrifice”

Capitalism, desire and the victimization of the “other”

Revolutions, “mimetic desire” and the scapegoat

Nuclear deterrence, imitation mechanism and (in)stability

Financial crises and the vicious circle of rivalry

Please send abstracts with “2013 Girard Conference” in subject line to:

Dr Antonio Cerella: acerella@uclan.ac.uk

Conference blog: http://renegirard2013.wordpress.com/

Please address any inquiries to:

Dr Antonio Cerella

Lecturer in International Relations

School of Education and Social Sciences

University of Central Lancashire

Preston PR1 2EH

Lancashire, UK

Office: +44 (0) 1772 892798

The Social Aetiology of Mental Illness (SAMI) Training Program 2013–2014 Postdoctoral Fellowship

The Social Aetiology of Mental Illness (SAMI) Training Program 2013–2014 Postdoctoral Fellowship.  

Application Deadline: March 01, 2013 (5:00pm EST)

The Social Aetiology of Mental Illness (SAMI)Training Program is now accepting applications for the 2013-14 Postdoctoral Fellowship program.

The SAMI training program is a CIHR Strategic Training Initiative in Health Research Training Program based at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health and the University of Toronto, and includes international partners from across the globe. Fellowships are for 1 year, fully funded, research-based, and will help top-class research students further develop their skills in investigating the social aetiology of mental illness.

Deadline: March 1, 2013 (5:00pm EST). Please visit the SAMI Training Program website for more information on how to apply.

CONFERENCE WITHDRAWN: Philosophy and Psychiatry: The Next Hundred Years

Oxford conference 20th July 2013

"A preliminary announcement and call for papers was published recently in connection with this conference. 

Two of our invited speakers have pointed out that the programme as announced was not representative of the full range of diverse contributors to modern interdisciplinary work in philosophy and psychiatry: it failed in particular to reflect the key roles not only of ethnic minority groups and women but also, and crucially, of people who use services (including carers) as well as people who provide them.

Although only a preliminary programme which had not as yet been through INPP or local review and vetting procedures we regret the error and are withdrawing the event.

2013 is an important year for philosophy and psychiatry as the centenary of Karl Jaspers’ General Psychopathology and a number of celebratory events are being organised. The Oxford Sumer School in ‘Mind, Value and Mental Health’ (www.conted.ox.ac.uk/ox_ppss) and the publication of the 50th volume in the IPPP series, Giovanni Stanghellini and Thomas Fuchs’ ‘One Century of Jaspers’ General Psychopathology’ (www.oup.co.uk/series/ippp) have already been announced. Additional events offering in particular opportunities for submitted papers/posters and will be announced in the near future."

Bill Fulford on behalf of INPP

One-Day Conference & Lecture (London) “Christopher Boorse and Commentators: applying the Biostatistical Theory of Health to Mental Disorder”

“Christopher Boorse and Commentators: applying the Biostatistical Theory of Health to Mental Disorder”

Friday, 7^th December, Room 405, Philosophy Department, King’s College London

Christopher Boorse is well-known for his development of the Biostatistical Theory, a naturalistic account of disorder as dysfunction. His account continues to be widely discussed, but – although it is meant to apply to both somatic and mental disorder – it has received comparatively little attention in literature on mental disorder.

This one-day conference and lecture offer the unique opportunity to see Chris person; he has not been in Europe for over thirty years. It will also give a chance to discuss whether and how his account can be extended to apply to psychiatry. The conference and lecture should be of interest to philosophers of medicine, psychiatry, science and mind, as well as to psychiatrists, medical professionals and other health-care practitioners with an interest in philosophy.

Conference Program:

10:45 – 11:15 

Registration; Coffee and Tea

11:15 – 12:15 

Thomas Schramme, Professor of Practical Philosophy, University of Hamburg.

“Mental Disorder as Mental Dysfunction”

12:15 – 1:30 

Lunch

1:30 - 2:30 

Elselijn Kingma, Wellcome Research Fellow, King’s College Centre for Humanities and Health/Department of Philosophy.

“Three Reasons why our Concepts of Mental Disorder and Physical Disorder Differ”

2:30 – 3:30 

Rachel Cooper, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Lancaster University

“Precisifying Concepts: the Case of Mental Disorder”

3:30 – 4:00 Afternoon Tea

Lecture

4:00 – 5:30 

Christopher Boorse, Professor in Philosophy, University of Delaware

“Is Grief a Pathological Condition?”

This conference and lecture are organised jointly by the Department of Philosophy/Centre for Humanities and Health, King’s College London. Attendance is free, but please do confirm your attendance by sending an email to Julia Howse [Julia.howse@kcl.ac.uk] so we can judge numbers for catering.

Narrative structure and underlying reality?

I’ve mentioned here before that Laura Buckley is researching older people’s conceptions of wellbeing. She is exploring this through photographs taken by participants and using narrative analysis to explore their discussions of the significance of the pictures. In a supervision with Joy Duxbury and Bernie Carter this week, I was struck by the hint of a worry which is related to a previous worry.

The previous worry was this. Those who use narrative analysis in qualitative social science (let’s call them ‘narrative theorists’ and the approach ‘narrative theory’ for speed) seem to be tempted by two claims either one of which may be true but probably not both. They often stress the ubiquity of narratives (“Even a conversation at a bus-stop is a narrative”). But they also chart the internal structure of narratives (“All narratives have a moral” “There is always a Trickster”). It seems – albeit contingently – highly unlikely both are true. The more the interesting claims about the internal structure of narratives (eg the division into say seven elements of any narrative), the less likely that narratives are ubiquitous or of universal application to apparently non-narrative social situations (eg all conversations at bus-stops). One would expect, rather, it to be true of particular literary genres. The more the appeal to universal application, the less likely that all utterances in social situations form a narrative with a particular internal structure. My entirely informal survey of discussions with narrative theorists (not at UCLan, I hasten to add) is a fondness, nevertheless, for both claims.

The new worry – which is less straight forward and may be unfounded – goes something like this. If narrative theory really charts interesting and contingent aspects of the structure of the utterances of social science subjects then it contrasts with, say, a grammar theorist’s view. A theory of the grammar of a language – a grammar – is a sizeable achievement. But it does not provide an insight into the content of utterances: just the linguistic vehicles for expressing them. By contrast, the narrative theorist says things like ‘every narrative has seven elements:...’, which could obviously be false. If what makes the grammarian’s claims true is the structure of English, say, or the structure of English as spoken in C21 Preston, or the innate structure of human depth grammar, what would make the narrative theorists claims true?

Here is a thought. What they chart, intellectually riskily like any brave social scientist, are the contingent social practices of, say, C21 conversational participants. We can imagine the participants in contemporary Preston initially explicitly following some rules of good style in the way that one might follow the rules of haiku or lipogram construction and then this becoming second nature. The narrative theorists chart these conventions. But now suppose that we are interested in the views of wellbeing expressed by these subjects in conversations and that we ask them. If we attend to the form of the narrative (every narrative has a moral; every narrative has seven elements:..) that they offer in reply we run two related risks.

First, we will be examining not the structure of the subjects’ conception of wellbeing but rather the structure of their conversational engagement and that is looking in the wrong place. Second, if we do not realise this and set out the structure of what results (the moral; the seven elements etc) we run the risk of thinking that their conceptions of wellbeing are in some way narratively structured when in fact it is merely a contingent way of giving them expression. (Imagine that we investigate two groups who reply on two different kinds of narrative to set out their conceptions of wellbeing. Have they distinct conceptions of wellbeing or the same conception undergoing different conventional forms of expression?) The way to avoid this is to model narrative structure on grammatical structure. But if so, the substantive claims about narrative structures will be undermined.

(This worry parallels a worry about the relationship of the conceptually structured realm of appearance and the underlying noumenal realm on a two world reading of Kant. Once the noumenal realm is part of a composite picture, the process of conceptualising it in one way (rather than another) looks to be distorting of what is really real. One needs to think that the structure is not a substantive mediation but merely a way of letting the reality shine through.)