At the same, however, my anhedonia seems to have eased. Why
is this?
By anhedonia I mean…
Let me go back a bit. My parents died in 2014 in what ended
up a rather horrible year. It began with the best Liptonian explanation –
according to my consultant – of my sudden deafness being a life-threatening brain
tumour. I didn’t cope well with this for the days I waited news. In the week
that I got the all-clear, my mother was rushed to hospital and died both
suddenly and slowly a few weeks later of leukaemia. My father, for whom she’d
been a key informal carer, lived a precarious existence for the next 4 months
rescued from death by diabetic coma on 4 occasions by visiting nurses breaking
in. He died the day I went to spend three dark and gloomy months in a room in a
castle in Durham weirdly shunned by the other members of the college. I
underwent a thorough grief period for the rest of 2014 and then the first half
of 2015. And then I slipped into depression, anxiety attacks and intrusive compulsive
thoughts.
Four years later and after a variety of talking cures, much
of all that has improved. But the one thing that showed no sign of lifting
was a kind of anhedonia which had two key elements.
1) A loss of the ability to be struck by happiness.
2) A loss of anticipatory happiness.
By 1) I mean that while it would be absurd to say that when in a flow activity I was unhappy, I could not experience the happiness as happiness. I never had the kind of glad start of thinking: Gosh isn’t the sun on my back rather lovely! That slightly self-conscious, meta-level happiness in one’s happiness stopped. By 2) I mean that while I had a cognitive attitude to the likelihood of the kind of happiness permitted by 1) a day later when next in the pub with friends, that induction, that belief, had no effect on my mood beforehand. I had never noticed before that the prospect of future happiness permits a kind of borrowing of happiness itself. One can be happy in virtue of and in advance of later happiness.
1) A loss of the ability to be struck by happiness.
2) A loss of anticipatory happiness.
By 1) I mean that while it would be absurd to say that when in a flow activity I was unhappy, I could not experience the happiness as happiness. I never had the kind of glad start of thinking: Gosh isn’t the sun on my back rather lovely! That slightly self-conscious, meta-level happiness in one’s happiness stopped. By 2) I mean that while I had a cognitive attitude to the likelihood of the kind of happiness permitted by 1) a day later when next in the pub with friends, that induction, that belief, had no effect on my mood beforehand. I had never noticed before that the prospect of future happiness permits a kind of borrowing of happiness itself. One can be happy in virtue of and in advance of later happiness.
I realised last week that I didn’t feel burdened by either
of these notions. I don’t think it’s because I’ve regained the spontaneous
experience of my state as a state of happiness but its lack doesn’t seem such a
problem. Nor does an attenuated weekend fill me with Thursday morning glee. I'm not more happy, in other words.
Might it be this? I don’t think that the C-19 form of life would
allow for that much of what I’m lacking anyway? In which case, I’ve got the
phenomenology of my anhedonia wrong. The lack isn’t either 1 or 2 but a lack of self-conscious enjoyment of what’s missing in both cases. So for 1, I don’t miss a
reflective awareness of my happiness, I miss a meta-level enjoyment of a
capacity for a meta-level enjoyment of my happiness. To be honest, it wouldn’t
surprise me at all if it had ended up as indirect as this. Should have stuck to physics.