Monday, 21 June 2021

Postscript on Annalis Coliva’s book on Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense

I finished Annalis Coliva’s book on Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense (2010) but I was a little disappointed. After the care with which she set out Moore’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophical discussions, it was as though she just did not care so much about her own. In the introduction there was some discussion about being an historian of philosophy as well as a philosopher. Perhaps in this book that was where the interest lay. (I’ve also been reading but not commented on her book on extended rationality. That is delightfully philosophical but just not what I need at the moment.) I think, however, that her own view is expressed by endorsing summaries of Wittgenstein often earlier in the book.

The one thing I wanted was a careful account of hinges on her view. Unlike the Norman Malcolm paper I’ve just re-read, Coliva plays down the merely animal certainty of hinges and plays up the idea that hinges are propositions, albeit set against a background of merely animal certainty. So she contrasts with Daniele Moyal Sharrock’s non-propositional and ineffabilist view, too. She connects both these rejected views at the start of the book thus:

Moreover, as to our attitude with respect to them, if we held the ineffabilist conception of hinges, whereby, failing to be propositions, they could neither be said, nor made the object of any propositional attitude, our certainty with respect to them would have to be thought of as non- propositional, non-conceptual and therefore of a merely ‘animal’ kind. (ibid: 9)

The fullest account of her own position starts from this rejection. Coliva takes hinges to be propositions, to be or to contain conceptual contents. A key claim is that this does not require that we stand in an epistemic relation to them.

Finally, it remains to characterize our relationship to these propositions, whose role is that of norms. As Moyal-Sharrock and other interpreters have emphasized, it is thoroughly non epistemic and thus unlike belief, knowledge or even psychological certainty, for Wittgenstein. What they have failed to notice, in my view, however, is that this doesn’t entail, nor supports the view that it is animal or instinctual, and hence utterly non-propositional. After all, it has propositions – albeit of a normative kind – as its objects. So, what kind of propositional attitude may it be? I think an analogy would be useful here. Think of our rules of conduct, for example, we ought to stop at traffic lights when red. In fact we can and do say that we accept such a norm. That is to say, we behave in accord with it and would either reproach those who don’t, or accept to be reproached ourselves if we didn’t. Furthermore, we teach our children to obey it. This pragmatic sense of accepting a proposition whose nature is normative, to be contrasted with an epistemic sense of accepting empirical propositions for which we don’t have (enough) evidence, and with respect to which it would make utterly no sense to talk of epistemic evidence as it has norms as its objects, is, I submit, what Wittgenstein is alluding to when he talks of certainty with respect to hinges qua hinge-propositions. Now, the interesting aspect of our acceptance of hinges is that while being a pro-attitude, it is itself constitutive of epistemic rationality, and not merely a pragmatist acceptance due to an evaluation of its expected practical utility. (ibid: 174)
Yet, this pragmatic acceptance of rules tallies with many of Wittgenstein’s remarks which allude to our certainty as displayed in our way of acting. In particular, to acknowledge this sense of ‘accepting’ allows us not to go all the way down the path of mere ‘animal certainty’ and is compatible with saying that we accept, often implicitly and as a result of our upbringing, norms both of language and of evidential significance, and ‘instinctively’ behave in conformity with them, in ways which show no doubt. It must be stressed, moreover, that such an instinctive behaviour is not the one of the animal, but that of the human animal. That is to say, of the creature who has been drilled and taught to use language and to take part in our various epistemic practices and is thus already fully conceptual and a competent epistemic agent. If, then, there is still room for instinct here, it is one concerning our so- called second nature, not our merely first and animal one. (ibid: 174-5)

So, ‘animal certainty’ is really not the focus of On Certainty, though it is a precondition for being drilled to take part in our various language games. What On Certainty centres on are rather those propositions which, as a result of our upbringing within a community that shares a language and a form of life, we can reflectively identify as being exempt from verification and control as well as from doubt. This makes them play the role of norms, either of language or of evidential significance. Moreover, with respect to them, we do practically (as opposed to epistemically) accept them – that is to say, we behave in accord with them, in ways which know no doubt – where our doing so is, in its turn, constitutive of epistemic rationality. (ibid: 175)

So the picture is one of a background of animal certainty upon which, through education and development of a McDowellian second nature, conceptually articulated propositional certainties can be built. These are thus the object of propositional attitudes though not epistemic propositional attitudes. Various questions arise such as the nature of the attitude and how the hinges’ propositionality is realised.

With respect to the former. in the passages just quoted, Coliva sketches an initial analogy between hinges and pragmatic acceptance. But she adds that the relevant attitude to hinges is not merely a pragmatist acceptance - due to an evaluation of its expected practical utility - but is rather constitutive of epistemic rationality.

So what is the limited positive aspect of the analogy? We behave in accord with pragmatic norms and also with hinges and would reproach those who don’t. But the hinges also play a non-contingent role in the constitution of rationality. What is this role? I’m not sure. But it seems to have something to do with using – if that is the right verb – the propositional hinges for normative rather than descriptive purposes. We instruct people using hinges and we accept them as the normative standards that establish the epistemic language game, I think.

By contrast, by defending the view that hinges are propositions, though normative rather than descriptive in nature, and that our certainty with respect to them is a kind of acceptance which displays itself in our acting in accord with them, we make both certainties and certainty with respect to them effable. Of course, I think Moyal-Sharrock is right to claim that when we utter hinges qua hinges we mostly do so with heuristic purposes in mind of the kind she correctly identifies. Yet, by acknowledging their propositionality hinges become indeed sayable as such – that is to say, as norms. (ibid: 177)

The second comment – about when we utter hinges qua hinges – connects a heuristic purpose, which I think Coliva accepts, with the propositionality and hence sayability of hinges as such. Utterances can have propositional contents.

Earlier she expresses this thus:

On the contrary, I hold the view that while failing at bipolarity, they are still propositions, albeit with a normative function, rather than a descriptive one, and that we do indeed express them on various occasions: either to teach them to someone who ignored them or to remind someone of them were they to violate them, as philosophers such as Moore and a sceptic do. Contrary to other framework interpreters, most notably Moyal-Sharrock, I do think that at least the former context in which hinges are actually said is a genuine language game, by Wittgensteinian lights. (ibid: 10)

So the normative use is connected to heuristic purposes and is part of a genuine language game, not a misfiring piece of nonsense. That gives us one place for hinges: in instructing people how to play the game of giving and asking for reasons, which is based on certainties. The proposition is the content of the instructional utterance. But what is our attitude to them when they take a role in propositional attitudes which display themselves in our acting in accord with them? It seems: pragmatic acceptance. But that seems odd. It seems prima facie odd to model the certainty of hinges on mere pragmatic acceptance.

Another line of thought may help. Coliva contrasts her view with Moore’s.

when taken in those very circumstances, Moore’s propositions don’t have an empirical role, but a normative one. In the twofold sense that they are both linguistically paradigmatic judgements – that is to say, judgements that must be agreed on if the meaning of the words in them is to be determined – and epistemically paradigmatic ones. That is to say, judgements that can’t be called into question on the basis of contrary evidence, for they must stay put – however in context that might be – in order for a subject to be in a position rationally to gather any kind of evidence for other, genuinely empirical propositions. (ibid: 80)

The first part of this seems to characterise an instructive use of an utterance rather than a propositional attitude. (There is a second aspect reflected by the phrase epistemically paradigmatic to which I'll return.) But the instructive use looks to be meta-linguistic. It’s something like: call this! a ‘hand’, linking mention of a word type and a demonstrative. The related propositional attitude would seem to be an attitude to the connection between the look of a hand and the word ‘hand’. But now, surely the right attitude is knowledge? I know the meaning of the word ‘hand’. I know that this is called a ‘hand’. But perhaps this is not enough because pragmatically accepting a norm here suggests not only knowing the standrd meaning or use of ‘hand’ in English but deciding to bind oneself to that norm. I'll return to this shortly.

Coliva, however, suggests that things run deeper than either knowledge of meaning or adoption of a norm by quoting a famous paragraph from the Investigations.

If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so. – It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call ‘measuring’ is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement. (PI §242)

I think that this gives content the idea that judgements about instances of hands play a role in underpinning the meta-linguistic point. (I also think that this links to the saying-showing distinction.) For Coliva, the fact that we do just judge in accord with the normative standard governing ‘hand’ is part of the logic of judgement.

To judge thus-and-so, in certain circumstances, is said, in OC, to be part of ‘our method of doubt and enquiry’. Now, everything which is part of method does in fact belong to ‘grammar’ and ‘logic’ too, in the extended, not merely linguistic sense that those terms came to have for Wittgenstein at the time of On Certainty. To judge that there is a hand in the circumstances of Moore’s proof therefore belongs to the logic of our epistemic practices because it is what must stand fast if we want to test other things – for example, the reliability of our senses – which we do in turn need to trust in order to go about forming specific empirical judgements in circumstances where it is an open question whether what we see in front of us is really a hand. So, that judgement is itself part of logic and therefore comes to have a normative role, rather than a genuinely empirical one. (ibid: 81-2)

I imagine a case in which one uses one’s hand to estimate the size of a spider – “It was as big as this hand!” – taking for granted the identity of the hand. But now I’m unsure about the nature of the propositional attitude. The hand, by contrast with the spider, is not an object of scrutiny. But still it seems bizarre to think of our attitude as being analogous to a pragmatic attitude, such as agreeing to stop at red traffic lights. We might take that towards the metalinguistic fact that we call hands ‘hands’ in English. Thus, I think we know and additionally and distinctly endorse as a practice for ourselves for successful communicative intent. As well as knowing that ‘hand’ means hand in English, we might also agree to be bound by the norm of using ‘hand’ in just this way for pragmatic reasons. We can also make sense of adopting a different policy. 

But what of the unreflective, animal-based but second nature, attitude towards this thing on the end of my arm being a hand? Although I may adopt a policy of speaking in accord with English norms, it does not seem that the prior recognition of my hand as a hand - or recognising it as the same thing over time - is a matter of policy. I don’t just ‘accept’ that. No other policy seems available. 

Instead it seems to be forced on one by an appreciation of one’s predicament. Other things may then follow such as the use of hands as comparison with spiders, for example, or the decision to follow regular English usage in their labelling. But we seem to be passive in the face of acknowledging what the world shows us. Why is it not simply knowledge?

Tuesday, 15 June 2021

Ontological and Epistemological Bases of Person Centered Medicine

Abstract

Person Centred Medicine is a substantial and contentious view of healthcare that carries both ontological and epistemological presuppositions. This chapter examines two key aspects: that the person is a central, basic irreducible element in ontology and that person-level knowledge is both important and possible. Some reasons for holding both of these are sketched.

10 key words

epistemology, normativity, ontology, persons, reductionism, rationality, self, space of reasons

Introduction

The precise nature of Person Centered Medicine (PCM) is contested. What are its implicit contrasts? Person versus patient or person versus sub-personal body part, for example? What are its essential features? Does it presuppose a specific set of person-level values? Such potential choices and conflicting claims, addressed in other chapters of this book, have consequences for articulating the bases of PCM.

‘Base’ itself suggests two meanings. It may mean the explicit justification or rationale for advancing PCM. Here, I offer a more minimal reading and leave the main work of justification for other chapters. I take the ‘bases’ of PCM to be its presuppositions: specifically, the kinds of ontological and epistemological claims it presupposes to be true. As will become clearer, however, this does offer some partial account of its rationale, too.

I assume that, however its precise nature is articulated, PCM assumes the following broad claims. Ontologically, the level of the person is an irreducible and significant feature of ontology and a proper focus for healthcare. Epistemologically, not only is knowledge of the human person (human beings, people) possible and significant in healthcare, there are also irreducible forms of person-level knowledge which are important to healthcare. A commitment to PCM is thus a substantive commitment to ontological and epistemological claims. I will examine these commitments in turn.

Objectives

My aim is to clarify the implicit conceptual or philosophical commitments (in ontology and epistemology) of subscribing to PCM. I take it as a premiss that to subscribe to PCM is to assume the genuine existence of persons, for example. A fully worked out account of that commitment might require a completely satisfactory philosophical analysis of ‘person’ and refutation of all rival accounts. But that is an unrealistic account of what is required to support PCM. In this short chapter I will restrict myself to the sort of claims presupposed for PCM. A full philosophical defence of PCM might be possible but would also require narrowing down a precise specification of what PCM is. My aim is more modest but therefore of broader application to a range of views of what PCM involves.

Approaches to fulfil the objectives and knowledge base #1: The ontological presuppositions of PCM

At the very least, PCM presupposes the existence of persons. Further, it assumes that the ‘level’ of the person is important and irreducible in healthcare. That is, truths about persons are not reducible without loss to truths at a more basic level, such as the biochemical functioning of the body and its parts. If such truths were reducible, there would be no need to complement or contrast conventional biomedical approaches with something distinct. PCM would be subsumed by a biomedical view of healthcare.

PCM need not reject the importance of bio-medical medicine so much as complement it. A proper knowledge of the functioning of bodily systems seems to be an essential feature of anything recognisable as general medicine by contrast, for example, with healthcare disciplines that focus solely on specific forms of mental pathology or distress, such as psychotherapy. On the other hand, to count as person centred, PCM must resist the claim that the concept of the person reduces without loss into a set of component bodily systems.

Given the success of modern science in explaining larger systems by decomposing them into the behaviour of smaller scale, simpler systems, what would rationalise the presupposition that the person is a basic feature of ontology and irreducible to smaller scale biology?

One once influential answer – and a helpful illustration here – is provided by Cartesian substance dualism. Descartes’ own account of the bulk of the natural world was that of a mechanical ‘plenum’: a packed world of direct causal pushes and pulls. Responding to the rise of mechanical natural philosophy – corresponding with the rise of modern science – Descartes assumed that mechanical models would apply very generally. At the same time, however, he exempted the mind from this domain. His dualism divides the world into two realms of different sorts of substance: res extensa – the domain of direct causal interaction within a spatial realm – and res cogitans, the non-spatial mental realm. Despite this distinction, the mental realm appears to be modelled on the mechanical philosophy in one sense: mental states are free-standing states, acting as though akin to causal factors [McDowell 1998a: 237-243]. This is one of the features that makes accounting for everyday mental phenomena difficult: for example, the capacity for thoughts to be relational rather than free-standing, about things, to possess ‘intentionality [ibid: 242-3]. If thoughts are free standing items in an inner realm, how can they be about anything, in the outer realm? Another is the problem Descartes himself recognised of accounting for the apparent interaction of the mental and extended realms.

If we put those objections to one side for the moment, however, Cartesian substance dualism would provide a rationale for PCM by explaining one of its presuppositions. Substance dualism implies that persons – possessors of both mental and physical attributes – cannot be entirely made of extended matter. The mental belongs to a distinct non-bodily realm. But subscription to what now seems an outmoded approach to the mind would be a high price to pay for subscribing to PCM. So if not that, why else might one take the concept of the person to be irreducible?

One lesson of academic philosophy of mind since the 1970s is that there are many (apparently or epistemically) possible models of the relation of mind and body [Fulford et al 2006: 653]. At one end of a spectrum is substance dualism. At the other is eliminativism: the view that there are no mental states because the mental is a failed theory of the physical and should be eliminiated. Between are varieties of forms of property dualism, more or less closely tethered by supervenience (an asymmetric relation of dependence), and reductionist physicalism (the view that the mental can be reduced without loss to physical descriptions). Thus, a commitment to PCM requires a rejection of eliminativism and reductionist physicalism but leaves open a variety of other ontological positions. But what might motivate that choice however precisely it might be realised?

Within analytic philosophy of mind, two main lines of argument have been stressed. One concerns the irreducibility of the qualitative aspects of mental states and experiences: their qualia. One such argument is Frank Jackson’s thought experiment concerning Mary the neuroscientist, locked in a black and white room but knowing the full physics and neurophysiology of colour vision [Jackson 1986]. Surely, runs the line of thought, she learns something new when presented for the first time with a red object? But if so, there is at least one fact to be learnt – what red looks like to the conscious mind – that cannot be captured within physical and neurophysiological theory. So reductionism of the mental to the physical is false.

A second line of argument, associated with Donald Davidson, concerns the irreducibility of the structure of rationality to mere lawlike relations between natural events [Davidson 1980: 229-44]. On the twin assumptions that the mental is essentially tied to rationality, and that rationality cannot be codified into any structure of laws and hence captured in physical theory, then the mental is irreducible to physical properties.

Such arguments – or the premises of such arguments however precisely formalised: the appeal to qualia or to rationality – supply plausible motivations for subscribing to a view of the irreducibility of the mental to something physical of bodily. But that is not yet to say that the notion of a person is specifically of importance. What of the centrality of the person?

There is a line of thought in philosophy dating back to David Hume which would motivate scepticism about its importance, even while conceding the importance of the mental. Hume presents an argument that focuses on the nature of the self as something mental able to unify (mental) experiences as the experiences of a particular subject. Hume suggests that an introspective search for such a self, as the subject of thoughts and experiences, yields nothing.

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. . . . If anyone, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in me. [Hume 1978: 252]

Hume’s final comment is clearly meant to be ironic. Introspection, Hume suggests, reveals nothing that could stand in the sort of relation to one’s mental states that a self is supposed to do. This leads him to advocate a minimalist ‘bundle theory’ of mind. The self is identified simply with the mental states encountered in introspection and not with an ego which stands in some ownership relation to them. Philosophers since Hume have adopted a variety of responses that concede the basic point. Daniel Dennett argues that the self is an abstraction: a narrative structure of mental states. ‘A self is also an abstract object, a theorist’s fiction.’ [Dennett 1992]. Others have denied the existence of self in favour of underlying neurological structures [Hofstadter 2007; Metzinger 2003; Taylor 1999]

There is, however, a conflicting line of thought dating back to Kant that grants an important basic status to the person. The philosopher Peter Strawson offers an explicitly Kantian account [Strawson 1959, 1966]. To earn the right to the idea that experiences are unified as the experiences of a particular subject (a person), there has to be some way to specify or identify that subject. Without some such criteria, the idea of a single subject is vacuous. But as Hume’s description of introspection reveals, conscious experience does not yield any criteria to identify a subject (or owner) for one’s experiences. It reveals only the experiences themselves. From this, Hume concludes that there is no substantial self. But there are criteria for the identification of a subject available elsewhere: third-person criteria for the ascription of experiences to fellow human beings on the basis of what they say and do.

Strawson suggests that these can provide substance to the idea of a self even though they are not appealed to in self-ascriptions of experiences. This is because, while self-ascription of experiences is made without any appeal to these (or any other) criteria to identify a subject, it is still made in accord with them. As Strawson puts it, ‘The links between criterionless self-ascription and empirical criteria of subject-identity are not in practice severed’ [Strawson 1966: 165]. Thus, it is because we are identifiable from a third person perspective as embodied subjects located within the world that we can also self-ascribe experiences without appeal to, but still in accord with, those criteria. The third-person criteria substantiate the idea of a subject.

Strawson goes on to argue that the person is a basic feature of ontology. Persons have, essentially, both physical and mental predicates. It is this combination that underpins the kind of subjective perspective to which Hume appeals but which cannot, by itself, constitute a self. As the contemporary philosopher John McDowell puts it:

The alternative [to a purely mental construal of the self as subject of experience] is to leave in place the idea that continuity of “consciousness” constitutes awareness of an identity through time, but reject the assumption that that fact needs to be provided for within a self-contained conception of the continuity of “consciousness”. On the contrary, we can say: continuous “consciousness” is intelligible (even “from within”) only as a subjective angle on something that has more to it than the subjective angle reveals, namely the career of an objective continuant with which the subject of the continuous “consciousness” identifies itself. The subjective angle does not contain within itself any analogue of keeping track of something, but its content can nevertheless intelligibly involve a stable continuing reference, of a first person kind; this is thanks to its being situated in a wider context, which provides for an understanding that the persisting referent is also a third person, something whose career is a substantially traceable continuity in the objective world. [McDowell 1998b: 363]

I do not wish to suggest, in this brief chapter, that a Kantian account of the nature of the person and a Strawsonian justification of its ontologically basic status is a necessary presupposition of PCM. But it provides a worked example of the kind of account to which PCM is committed: to the existence and importance of persons as a basic feature in ontology.

Approaches to fulfil the objectives and knowledge base #2: The epistemological presuppositions of PCM

Just as PCM presupposes that the person is a proper part of ontology – an irreducible level of description of the natural world – so it also carries epistemic presuppositions. Centrally, it is possible to have knowledge of persons. To clarify this point, think of the more normal English plural. It is possible to have knowledge of people. Well of course it is! But a biomedical perspective that explicitly rejected the principles of PCM would still claim knowledge of the bodies, of their functions and dysfunctions, of people. Thus, to arrive at a presupposition that marks PCM out as a distinct substantive and potentially contentious approach, it is necessary to say something more. It is not just that knowledge of persons is possible, for example, of their bodies, but that knowledge of persons or people as persons is possible. What might be the characteristic content of such person-specific knowledge?

The previous section, however, mentioned one way to substantiate just such a claim. Descriptions of mental phenomena answer to a distinct constitutive principle that ‘finds no echo in physical theory’: the Constitutive Ideal of Rationality [Davidson 1980: 223]. To adopt a different metaphor: even without subscribing to a dualism of substances (mental and physical), one might still recognise a distinction between two conceptual spaces or modes of intelligibility: the space of reasons and the realm of law [Sellars 1997]. The former has application at the level of the person and captures a normative or evaluative character in the assessment of reasons for belief or action. One of the features that mark out persons or people from other objects of scientific scrutiny is that people, unlike planets or atoms, act for reasons or motives or to further goals or interests and they can be successful or fail in the attempt. This introduces a normative dimension – a dimension of correctness or incorrectness, good or bad – that is missing from basic physical sciences. Thus, part of the way in which PCM earns the right to claim a sui generis level of knowledge of persons as persons is to commit to the importance and irreducibility of placing subjects in the ‘logical space of reasons’.

This link opens up connections to other areas often taken to be part of PCM when less minimally approached. (Recall that this chapter has adopted a minimal approach to what PCM requires in order to explore the central ontological and epistemological presuppositions of any plausible view of PCM.) The space of reasons is also the space of values. Thus, any version of PCM that argues for the moral and ethical consequences or presuppositions of treating patients as persons will have to trade in this space: the space of evaluating the Good and the True.

But while sketching the logical space of knowledge of persons as persons helps show the nature of the ambition for PCM it does not address one specific worry that, while philosophically-influenced, can occur in reflective moments inspired by everyday life. It is the worry that, desirable that knowledge of other people – as persons – is, it is strictly impossible. One can never achieve good enough evidence to justify claims about another’s mental life. Such is the worry. Here is a way to seem – misleadingly! – to ground it. Consider again the Cartesian substance dualist picture of the relation of mind and body. If mind and body occupy different dimensions – the physically extended and the thinking – then it seems that no form of perception based on causal receptivity in the physical realm can yield awareness of other minds because minds are simply not in that realm. How therefore is knowledge of others as persons so much as possible? Surely one can never bridge the gap between one’s own experience of another person and their actual thoughts and feelings? This worry then seems to float free of the specifically Cartesian dualist background. Even if the mind is software running on the hardware of brains – as philosophical functionalism claims – how is it possible to infer from someone’s behaviour to their underlying software state?

During the last 30 years, there have been two dominant philosophical answers to this question. One approach argues that such knowledge is akin to scientific theoretically mediated knowledge of unobservable entities: ‘theory theory’ [Davies and Stone 1995a]. Its main rival starts from the idea of empathic projection: one imaginatively places oneself in the position of the other and imagines one’s thoughts and experiences: ‘simulation theory’ [Davies and Stone 1995b]. It is worth noting in practice how unsatisfactory either is to ground the idea that one can ever have genuine knowledge of how another person – a patient or service user or even a loved one, perhaps – is feeling. We do not seem to know the theory presupposed by the former approach while the act of imagination outlined by the second seems inadequate for knowledge.

PCM need presuppose no particular account of how person-level knowledge of persons as persons is possible. Its commitment is not to any specific explanation of how but to the more generic claim that it is possible. However, it is worth noting that the very idea that there is a problem to be solved may be more philosophical – albeit longstanding – artefact than common sense.

A helpful alternative view stems from the same account of the basic role of persons highlighted in the previous section which is both essentially mental and physical. If one starts from that perspective, rather than the dualistic separation of mind and body, then there is no need to deny the common-sense idea that human minds can express themselves in human behaviour and hence be known by others through that expressive behaviour. This contrasts with the ‘alienated’ conception of our relation to others that underpins a Cartesian view of human bodies where bodies are brute machines at best merely controlled by minds that inhabit a different dimension. On the non-Cartesian picture, one can have a form of almost direct knowledge of another’s mental states. It is direct knowledge of the expression of the mental state. As John McDowell argues, experience of other people is not limited to their bare behaviour, with mentality hidden behind it. The idea of almost direct knowledge can be applied:

in at least some cases of knowledge that someone else is in an “inner” state, on the basis of experience of what he says and does. Here we might think of what is directly available to experience in some such terms as “his giving expression to his being in that ‘inner’ state”; this is something that, while not itself actually being the “inner” state of affairs in question, nevertheless does not fall short of it in the sense I explained. (McDowell 1998a.: 387)

Although one person’s inner states do not themselves fall within the direct perceptual experience of another person (hence ‘almost’), the fact that they express them can. This idea of expression is not one that is consistent with the absence of the inner state. So McDowell replaces an account in which all that is visible to an observer is another person’s intrinsically brute or meaningless behaviour, standing in need of further interpretation and hypothesis, with one in which that behaviour is charged with meaning and expression.

One way to think about this alternative to the Cartesian picture is to think about how one might describe another person’s smile. We naturally reach for apparently epistemically risky and mind-presupposing words over the supposedly more basic purely physical descriptions. A smile is relaxed, ecstatic, forced, brave etc. Such descriptions are easier to offer than the purely geometric and non-mental descriptions that the Cartesian picture of the relation of others’ bodies and minds would suggest.

This particular philosophical ‘diagnosis’ of the implicit error behind the thought that it can seem that direct person-level knowledge is impossible provides one rationale for thinking that epistemological strand of PCM is fully justifiable. But it is not necessary to accept this to subscribe to PCM. The epistemological mark of PCM is merely that there is an available form of knowledge, couched at the level of the person, that is a key component of healthcare alongside more basic knowledge of bodily functions and dysfunctions.

Practical Implications

The practical implications of adopting a PCM approach will be explored more directly in other chapters of this book. The purpose of this conceptual and theoretical chapter is to clarity the presuppositions and suggest the logical space for such a distinctive view. Only if some things are ruled out by it does PCM have any content. I have argued that what is ruled out is the idea that person-level claims can be reduced without loss to lower level bio-medical claims and that there is no distinctive person-level knowledge. I have also offered a brief route map to escape the pessimistic thought that it is simply impossible to have knowledge of other people’s mental states.

But some practical implications are immediately apparent. If person level knowledge exists and is irreducible and assuming that it is important to healthcare (a claim for which I have not offered argument here for reasons of space but is apparent elsewhere in this book) then the pursuit of person level knowledge requires the right kind of inquiring stance. Since the most obvious way to find out how things stand with another person is to ask them, and to listen to what they say, and to watch what they do, then these forms of inquiry must be available in doctor-patient, or specialist-client, or practitioner-service user relations.

Discussion and conclusions

Person Centred Medicine is a substantial and contentious view within the philosophy and practice of healthcare. The mark of its substance is that it rules some things out. It is incompatible with some other views of nature and hence healthcare. In this chapter, I have explored its main broad presuppositions concerning ontology and epistemology. Its commitment to the existence of the person as a basic and irreducible element within ontology stands in opposition to views that deny that by, for example, promising to reduce the concept of the person to more basic phenomena. Thus, it stands opposed to various reductionist views. Its commitment to there being a form of person level knowledge and it being achievable stands in opposition both to claims that there is no such irreducible level or sceptical claims that it is impossible to attain. Although advocates for PCM need not have a fully worked out philosophy of the person or person-level knowledge, I have sketched the nature of this sort of commitment and made some suggestions for how they might be supported.

References

Davidson, D. (1980) Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Davies, M. and Stone, T. (ed.) (1995a) Folk Psychology: a guide to the theory of mind debate. Oxford: Blackwell.

Davies, M. and Stone, T. (ed.) (1995b) Mental Simulation: evaluations and applications. Oxford: Blackwell.

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Taylor, J.G. (1999) The race for consciousness. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Friday, 11 June 2021

First thoughts on starting to read Annalis Coliva’s Moore and Wittgenstein

I’ve been reading Annalis Coliva’s excellent book on Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense (2010). The discussion of Moore in chapter 1 seems very helpful. In chapter 2, however, I’m torn between admiring the clear exposition of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and a sneaking feeling that she subscribes to one aspect of the sort of thing I used to say about On Certainty and now feel uncomfortable with. My hunch is that she has a relaxed construal of knowledge which resembles something like a true belief based on a good enough reason. Further, I think this is motivated by focusing too much on the claim ‘I know’. Spotting that that is fallible – one can claim to know when one does not know – she then locates the fallibility too closely, I fear, with the state of knowledge itself rather than with its first person self-ascription. Still I'm early in the book and may be quite wrong or, equally, later persuaded.

For example, is the following merely a slip or is it significant? First she quotes On Certainty and then picks up a line of thought. 

According to Wittgenstein, here are some examples of the correct use of ‘I know’:...

Someone with bad sight asks me: ‘do you believe that the thing we can see there is a tree?’ I reply ‘I know it is; I can see it clearly and am familiar with it’. – A: ‘Is N. N. at home?’ – I: ‘I believe he is.’ – A: ‘Was he at home yesterday?’ – I: ‘Yesterday he was – I know he was; I spoke to him.’ – A: ‘Do you know or only believe that this part of the house was built on later than the rest?’ – I: ‘I know it is; I got it from so and so’. (OC 483)

In these cases, then, one says ‘I know’ and mentions how one knows [das Grund], or at least one can do so. (OC 484) (Coliva 2010: 62)

A paragraph later she is able to offer the description and conclusion she wants which runs:

[T]he fact that in general our use of ‘to know’ in the first person present be made on the basis of grounds – whatever they contextually happen to be – is a criterion for saying that that use of ‘I know’ was meaningful though, perhaps, mistaken. Thus, if I had talked to NN’s twin brother this would (probably) falsify the claim that NN was at home and would (certainly) show that I did not know, but only believed to have talked to him. My claim ‘I know that NN was at home yesterday’ would thus be false, but my use of ‘I know’ would not be nonsensical. By contrast, if I claimed to know that NN was at home yesterday but if I were unable to offer reasons in favour of such a claim, that would show that I misused the expression ‘I know’. (ibid: 62-3)

A condition on the ordinary use of ‘I know’ – she says – is that one is able to offer grounds. But one may be in error, or merely not know, if, for example, the grounds offered fail, for example if one has mistaken his twin brother for NN. But the passage just before that gets her to this conclusion runs:

Let us consider the second of Wittgenstein’s examples from the above mentioned quotation. The fact that I talked to NN yesterday and offer it as my ground for saying that I know he was at home is a criterion for the correct assertion ‘I know that…’. A criterion is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for knowledge that p. For, clearly, I could have talked to NN’s twin brother, and NN could have been at home while I had no conversation with him. (ibid: 62 both italics added)

Here Coliva seems to think that the fact that I talked to NN fails to act as sufficient grounds for the claim to knowledge because – for all I know, let’s assume - I could have talked instead to NN’s twin brother. That possibility of error implies, she says, that actually talking to NN is merely a criterion on the model of criteria where they are neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. But with no other undermining circumstances described, why is (the fact of) talking to NN at his home not sufficient for knowing him to have been at home? 

This seems to hint at a highest common factor of experience in which one could never take in the fact of talking to NN – because it is possible to confuse NN and his twin – and hence the invocation of that fact as grounds for a knowledge claim should be interpreted merely as a highest common factor analogue. Not the full fact as she actually states it but that merely under an interpretation of what it shares with talking to his twin brother: seeming to talk to NN (or his twin). (Of course, it does change things if his twin lives with NN and I know that I cannot tell them apart. In that case the fact of seeing NN rather than, as it happens and by luck, his twin cannot impress itself on me and hence my capacity for knowledge is undermined. But none of this has been specified.)

This looks like the difficulty I’ve seen elsewhere of drawing conclusions for knowledge from the fallibility of claims expressed via ‘I know…’.

Here’s a longer passage a little later from pp74-6. Coliva here follows Wittgenstein so my qualms may be with him rather than her. But she does endorse the view that emerges. I will intersperse lengthy quotation with my comments.

Wittgenstein, as we saw in §2.2, thinks that ‘the difference between the concept “knowing” and the concept of “being certain” isn’t of any great importance at all’ except, however, ‘where “I know” is meant to mean: I can’t be wrong’ (OC 8). When we say that we are certain ‘we express complete conviction, the total absence of doubt, and thereby we seek to convince other people. That is subjective certainty’ (OC 194, cf. 245, 415). But – asks Wittgenstein – ‘when is something objectively certain?’ (ibid. my italics); and answers, ‘When a mistake is not possible’ (ibid.). That is to say, when the possibility of being mistaken is ‘logically excluded’ (cf. ibid. my italics). (Coliva 2010: 74-5)

So knowing and being certain are not substantially different except in this context though note that it is still explored via an ‘I know’ claim (rather than, eg., looking at when we might properly ascribe knowledge in the third person). When ‘I know’ is meant to mean: I cannot be wrong, then there is a difference. It would be good to know what this is.

Well when we say ‘I am certain’ that expresses, she says, complete conviction, the total absence of doubt. So that sounds to be equivalent of saying ‘I cannot be wrong’. So that sounds just the same as the use of ‘I know’ we’ve just had to mean the same thing: I cannot be wrong. Hence I’m confused.

The passage from Wittgenstein continues with the distinction of subjective and objective certainty. My hunch is that subjective certainty is a status that applies to the claims ‘I know’ and ‘I am certain’ - both expressive of the total absence of doubt - whether or not they are true. That is, one is subjectively certain if one claims knowledge falsely. We might say: although Jones was certain, in his own mind, he turned out not to know and, in fact, to be quite wrong. (There is no equivalent: subjectively know, ie. falsely.) Objective certainty applies to a combination of subjective certainty and the idea that mistake is actually not possible.

Given that subjective certainty did not deliver the promised distinction between knowing and being certain, is the idea that a distinction enters only with objective certainty? This would falsify the initial too wide claim but understandably so. But if so it implies that Wittgenstein and Coliva hold that knowledge is compatible with some possibility of being wrong: being right though one might have been wrong; being right though only by luck. But that seems to me to undermine the very idea of knowledge. 

Note that it is perfectly possible, as above, that the claim ‘I know’ is false but here we seem to be talking about knowledge itself not merely false claims to have it. She continues:

At another place, however, he writes,

‘Knowledge’ and ‘certainty’ belong to different categories. They are not two ‘mental states’ like, say ‘surmising’ and ‘being sure’ (…). What interests us now is not being sure but knowledge. That is, we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is to be possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one. (OC 308)

But, as we saw in §2.2, sometimes ‘I am certain’ can occur in place of ‘I know’, and yet, Wittgenstein now says, ‘I know’ doesn’t express a subjective conviction. (ibid: 75)

This is puzzling assuming - possibly utterly wrongly - my approach above. I’d like to say that ‘I know’ expresses (it does not ensure) a (hence fallible) claim to objective certainty though we might – on the suggestion above – ascribe to the person ‘subjective certainty’ should they prove to be in error about the facts. Perhaps the latter could be flagged as indicated. The sincere claim expresses an objective claim about the world that may prove false and indicates that the speaker holds it with great conviction, which still holds even if they are wrong about the world. I am yet to see why this is helpful, however.

This makes it puzzling to see how for Wittgenstein ‘I am certain’ can express a subjective conviction and thus a mental state. In the contexts in which ‘I know’ can be substituted by ‘I am certain’, I suggest to interpret both these claims as in fact equivalent to the following one: ‘for all I know, things are thus- and-so’. For this last assertion makes clearer how my certainty is here a function of the information, evidence and grounds I have in favour of a given hypothesis. This, however, doesn’t guarantee that things are as I – with good right – claim them to be. Thus, one can say that my certainty is subjective, as it is a function of a subject’s state of information. (ibid: 75)

There seems to be something strange and very wrong about glossing the sincere claims ‘I know’ or ‘I am certain’ as for all I know, things are thus-and-so. If someone says that, then they ought to withdraw the claim ‘I know’ or ‘I am certain. Unless it is an empty philosophical musing, ‘for all I know’ undermines the claim of either. Lots of sentences about cultural practice in distant countries can follow my own use of ‘For all I know’ and none of them are then knowledge (they would be mostly false, even).

This doesn’t mean that the claim ‘I am certain’ would somehow be arbitrary and whimsical. Simply, my certainty doesn’t exclude the possibility of error: I could have overlooked or misinterpreted some evidence and wrongly taken it to support ‘p’; or else, I could fail to have some decisive piece of evidence against it. (ibid: 75)

To the contrary, I am inclined to say that the previous suggestion about ‘for all I know’ really does make the follow up claim ‘I am certain’ arbitrary and whimsical! It ought to be withdrawn immediately by a competent speaker. The rest of this seems, again, to ignore the difference between what is claimed and what might prove to be the case. ‘I know’ is fallible. Again, I suspect the problem comes from looking at first person rather than third person ascriptions.

So, we can make sense of Wittgenstein’s claim that, in this case, one’s certainty would be subjective. Yet, can we also make sense of his claim that it would then be a mental state? After all, it won’t differ from knowledge and Wittgenstein, as we saw in §2.1, stressed the fact that knowledge isn’t a mental state. He writes,

One may for example call ‘mental state’ what is expressed by tone of voice in speaking, by gestures etc. It would thus be possible to speak of a mental state of conviction, and that may be the same whether it is knowledge or false belief. (OC 42)

I think that the kind of certainty Wittgenstein dubs ‘subjective’ isn’t itself a mental state, just as knowledge isn’t, for him, but that it can be accompanied by a particular ‘mental state of conviction’, that can be manifested in the tone of voice and in one’s manners. That there be such aspects of ‘tone’ and that there be also a particular mental state of conviction – a special feeling, as it were – is entirely plausible, from a phenomenological point of view. This, however, doesn’t exclude the possibility of error. I may feel as certain as ever of having taken my keys this morning when I left home, and yet find out later that I didn’t. A particular feeling is not a sufficient condition (nor a necessary one) for the truth of the hypothesis one claims to be certain about, as it could occur both when one really knows that p and ‘p’ is thus the case and when one doesn’t know it because in fact ‘p’ isn’t the case. So one’s claim to be (subjectively) certain and its accompanying feelings of total conviction don’t guarantee the impossibility of being mistaken. (ibid: 75-6)

This seems to be making unnecessarily heavy weather of the fact that claims to know are fallible. But the suggestion somehow lurking here that one might self ascribe knowledge – in an ‘I know’ claim – via introspection of feelings of certainty seems bizarre. She says: A particular feeling is not a sufficient condition (nor a necessary one) for the truth of the hypothesis one claims to be certain about. Who knew? But without that bizarre idea, I am not sure what this paragraph claims. Note that one would not normally claim to be subjectively certain unless, perhaps, one realises that one has taken a drug and has become unreliable. One might, perhaps, say: I am weirdly subjectively certain about facts I couldn't possibly know so please ignore me.

Wittgenstein, therefore, isn’t interested in this kind of certainty [TT: a good thing too since it seems silly], nor, in this case, in the use of ‘I know’ within our usual language games, where it can be substituted by ‘I am certain/sure’. Rather, he wishes to clarify that peculiar use of ‘I know’ which is a synonym of ‘I can’t be wrong’ and which expresses objective certainty (OC 569). (ibid: 76)

But didn’t we have this assimilation earlier applied to subjective certainty? Perhaps not if the conjunction is played up. That is, he is interested in the use of ‘I know’ not just where it can be substituted by ‘I am certain/sure’ but where, in addition to that substitution, it actually also possesses objective certainty. If so, though, the word ‘express’ is in the wrong place. ‘I know’ expresses, fallibly, a claim to objective certainty. But also: surely this just means cases where one’s knowledge or certainty claim successfully excludes the possibility of mistake. And that still does not distinguish knowledge and certainty.

Still, I've two chapters to go and it may be that the butler really does it. I post this mainly in the hope of getting quick corrections to my email address.

Coliva, A. (2010) Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense, Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan

Monday, 7 June 2021

Closure vs underdetermination versions of scepticism

One of the things that confused me while reading Duncan Pritchard’s book Epistemic Angst is the distinction between closure-based and underdetermination-based versions of scepticism. I could see the overall architecture of the ‘output’ of this distinction but not the distinction itself. An instance of the former is given in a footnote of Pritchard’s paper ‘In defence of closure’.

I think the real anti-sceptical import of epistemological disjunctivism lies in responding to what I call underdetermination-based radical scepticism, which turns on a difference epistemic principle to closure, and generates what I claim is a logically distinct radical sceptical argument. See Pritchard (2015, parts 1 & 3) for the details. (Pritchard forthcoming fn 18)

In the book, the need for distinct approaches to the distinct sources of scepticism is summarised in passages such as this.

Although the ultimate skeptical import of the universality of rational evaluation thesis and the insularity of reasons thesis is the same, it is important to note that they pose distinct epistemological challenges. Suppose, for example, that one rejected the universality of rational evaluation thesis and therefore argued that there are in principle limitations on the scope of rational evaluation. In this way, one could argue that closureRK-based inferences need to be restricted in some way to prevent them from taking the subject from local to global rational evaluations. One could thus undermine the closureRK-based radical skeptical paradox. In particular, one could hold that one’s rationally grounded knowledge of everyday propositions—as far as this formulation of the skeptical paradox goes at any rate—is entirely compatible with a lack of rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses (on account of the fact that one cannot employ a closureRK-based inference in order to claim that one’s rationally grounded knowledge of everyday propositions, if genuine, would entail the contested rationally grounded anti-skeptical knowledge).

It is far from obvious how that would help one resolve the problem posed by the insularity of reasons thesis, however. That one can have rationally grounded knowledge of mundane external world propositions while lacking rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses is one thing; that one can have adequately rationally grounded knowledge of mundane external world propositions when that rational basis (one is aware) does not favor one’s everyday beliefs over skeptical alternatives quite another. As one might put the point, if one’s everyday beliefs do not satisfy the underdeterminationRK principle, then in virtue of what, exactly, do they amount to rationally grounded knowledge? Thus, even with the closureRK principle out of (skeptical) action, one can still employ the underdeterminationRK principle—and, thereby, the insularity of reasons thesis—to motivate a radical skeptical conclusion.

So the general picture is this. Part of the originality of Pritchard’s view is that there are two sources of scepticism, which thus need two distinct treatments. For closure based scepticism, the treatment is an account of hinge epistemology (blocking the effects of closure). For underdetermination, he appeals to disjunctivism. That seems plausible enough, but I’m still not sure what the different sources are. These are each outlined in the first two chapters, one on each. In each case, a principle – closure or underdetermination – is used to generate an argument for scepticism and then an incompatible triad of prima facie plausible claims. And in each chapter, there’s a version of the principle and the argument that stresses an internalist, rationalist approach. For speed, I’ll simply give the quotes hoping that this outline is enough to explain what they are doing.

The Closure Principle
If S knows that p, and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby forming a belief that q on this basis while retaining her knowledge that p, then S knows that q.…

The Radical Skeptical Paradox (I)
(S11) One cannot know that one is not a BIV.
(S12) If one cannot know that one is not a BIV, then one cannot know that E.
(S13) One knows that E.…

[T]he epistemic externalist is keen to break the logical link between knowledge and rational support, such that one can have the former without the latter, they surely do not wish to disengage our everyday knowledge from rational support altogether. Or, at least, the skeptic can force a dilemma here. On the first horn of the dilemma is the charge that the epistemic externalist is ultimately offering no response at all to the skeptical problem. On the second horn is the charge that the epistemic externalist is presenting us with an epistemological proposal that is so revisionist, so discontinuous with our ordinary epistemic practices, that even the most ardent proponent of epistemic externalism would find it unpalatable.…

The ClosureRK Principle
If S has rationally grounded knowledge that p, and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby forming a belief that q on this basis while retaining her rationally grounded knowledge that p, then S has rationally grounded knowledge that q.…

The Radical Skeptical Paradox (II)
(S21) One cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV.
(S22) If one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV, then one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that E.
(S33) One has rationally grounded knowledge that E.…

The Inconsistent Radical Skeptical Triad
(I) One is unable to know the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses.10
(II) The closure principle.
(III) One has widespread everyday knowledge.…

The Underdetermination Principle
If S knows that p and q describe incompatible scenarios, and yet S lacks a rational basis that favors p over q, then S lacks knowledge that p.…

The Radical Skeptical Paradox (III)
(S31) One cannot have rational support that favors one’s belief that E over the BIV hypothesis.
(S32) If one cannot have rational support that favors one’s belief that E over the BIV hypothesis, then one does not know that E.
(S33) One knows that E.…

The UnderdeterminationRK Principle
If S knows that p and q describe incompatible scenarios, and yet S lacks a rational basis that favors p over q, then S lacks rationally grounded knowledge that p.…

The Radical Skeptical Paradox (IV)
(S41) One cannot have rational support that favors one’s belief that E over the BIV hypothesis.
(S42) If one cannot have rational support that favors one’s belief that E over the BIV hypothesis, then one does not have rationally grounded knowledge that E.
(S43) One has rationally grounded knowledge that E.…

The Inconsistent Radical Skeptical Triad**
(I**) One cannot have rational support that favors one’s belief in an everyday proposition over an incompatible radical skeptical hypothesis.
(II**) The underdetermination principle.
(III**) One has widespread everyday knowledge.

My confusion is that these seem very closely related sources of scepticism. It is not, for example, akin to the wide difference between Agrippan and Cartesian scepticism.

Now this does not help with Pritchard’s view, but it is interesting to look (at the suggestion of my ex-co-author) at Anthony Brueckner’s paper ‘The Structure of the Skeptical Argument’.

Brueckner sets out the argument for scepticism using material similar to Pritchard’s triad (give or take a NOT) starting with closure; then that we do not know the negation of the ringer; then that we do not know everyday claims.

(1A) If I know that P. then I know that -SK.
(2A) I do not know that -SK.
(3A) I do not know that P.

This is a first stab at codifying the argument. Closure is there as a big general premise but then, equally necessary, is the minor premise that we do not know the negation of the ringer. From that scepticism about everyday matters follows. But why don’t we know the negation of the ringer? For this, Brueckner invokes underdetermination. So the fuller argument is underpinned by two principles: Closure with respect to justification (CIJ) and also underdetermination (UP). Both are in play for the same argument.

(CIJ) For all S φ, ψ, if S has justification for believing that φ, and (φ → ψ), then S has justification for believing that ψ.

(UP) For all S, φ, ψ, if S’s evidence for believing that φ does not favor φ over some incompatible hypothesis ψ, then S lacks justification for believing that φ.
This underdetermination principle helps establish the result that I lack justification for believing that -SK.

This gives the fuller codification of external world scepticism thus:

(1B) If I have justification for believing that P, then I have justification for believing that -SK. [from (CIJ)]
(2B) If my evidence for believing that -SK does not favor -SK over SK, then I lack justification for believing that -SK. [from (UP)]
(3B) My evidence for believing that -SK (my sensory evidence) does not favor -SK over SK. [premise] (4B) I lack justification for believing that -SK. [from 2B, 3B]
(5B) I lack justification for believing that P. [from 1B, 4B]
(6B) I do not know that P. [from 5B]

This makes much more sense to me than Pritchard’s approach. In fact, however, Brueckner goes on first to compare underdetermination and closure and argue that they are very similar and then to reconstruct the whole argument using underdetermination alone as a kind of ‘uber’ principle. Here’s the former.

What is the difference, if any, between argument B's two underlying epistemic principles, viz. the underdetermination principle and the principle that justification is closed under entailment? It is helpful to consider the following principle, which is equivalent to (UP):
(UP') For all S, φ, ψ, if one has justification for believing that φ, and φ and ψ are incompatible, then one's evidence for believing that φ favors φ over ψ.
Now consider a principle which is equivalent to (CIJ'):
(CIJ") For all S, φ, ψ, if one has justification for believing that φ, and φ and ψ are incompatible, then one has justification for believing that -ψ.
(CIJ’') and (UP') share a common antecedent, but their consequents differ. Suppose that S has justification for believing that φ and suppose that ψ is a competing incompatible hypothesis. According to (CIJ"), S then has justification for rejecting ψ. According to (UP'), what follows from the supposition is that S's evidence for φ favors φ over ψ. What is the difference be- tween these two putative necessary conditions for S's justification for believing that φ? (CIJ") says nothing about S's evidence for believing that φ, thereby leaving it open that S's justification for φ is not evidentially based. Then S could have justification for believing both φ and -ψ without having evidence which favors φ over ψ. But in cases in which S's justification for φ is so based, do the principles differ? If (CIJ") were restricted to evidentially justified φs, then it seems that the resultant principle would be virtually equivalent to (UP').

Here’s the latter.

(1C) If my evidence for believing that P does not favor P over SK, then I lack justification for believing that P. [from (UP)]
(2C) My evidence for believing that P (my sensory evidence) does not favor P over SK. [premise]
(3C) I lack justification for believing that P. [from IC, 2C]
(4C) I do not know that P. [from 3C]

So my worry, in a nutshell, is that even without Brueckner’s reconstruction of closure in terms of underdetermination, I’m not sure that we have two forms of scepticism – akin to the distinction in kind between Agrippan and Cartesian, for example – as opposed to one codification with two underlying premises and hence two different potential points of attack for an anti-sceptic. One could attack closure – and hence the spread of the sceptical infection from a sceptical ringer back to everyday claims – or one could attack the efficacy of the sceptical ringer. If they are not distinct forms of scepticism, in the way Pritchard argues, there is no need for two simultaneous treatments. Hence the main selling point for his book looks rather odd.

(Then again, having just had my second AstraZeneca vaccine dose, I wouldn’t say no if offered the Pfizer as well.)

References

Brueckner, A. (1994) ‘The Structure of the Skeptical Argument’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 827-835

Pritchard, D.H. (2019) Epistemic angst: Radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pritchard, D.H. (forthcoming) ‘In defence of closure’ in Jope, M. Pritchard, D.H. (eds.) New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure, London: Routledge.

Friday, 4 June 2021

Norman Malcolm’s ‘Wittgenstein: The relation of language to instinctive behaviour’

As well as advising a UCLan philosophy student on his dissertation, my reason for returning to read the literature around On Certainty (OC) is one of those periodic realisations that a change of view in one area forces a change elsewhere. I realised that my quick summary, the sort of thing I used to say, at least on my previous interpretation of it, won’t do as an endorsing account of On Certainty.

The sort of thing I tend to say is that OC is radical because LW separates the game of giving and asking for reasons, of knowledge and doubt, from certainty. A framework of both animal and inherited certainty is the condition of possibility of knowledge claims and also of claims to doubt since doubts, too, take work and a context to make them reasonable. (On this, I like to remind myself that claiming that one didn’t know one’s suspiciously suddenly dead partner’s bank balance will not get waved through as it might in an epistemology class. One can be assumed to have picked up knowledge - rubbing off on one like an infectious disease - unless there is good reason why not.)

But implicit in my own past understanding of the sort of thing I tend to say was the idea that not only was knowledge distinct from the sort of certainties that plays a role in OC – let’s follow the literature and call them ‘hinge propositions’ – but that knowledge itself wasn’t certain. I thought this, if I am honest now, because I wasn’t much interested in epistemology and so had never really thought about any necessary conditions one could offer for knowledge (even if one eschews illuminating sufficient conditions). I suspect I subscribed implicitly to some sort of JTB analysis of knowledge and simply accepted that the justification condition didn’t need to be very strong. Reliabilism was sadly rife in the department in which I did my PhD (Cambridge HPS) and so perhaps this persuaded me in the same direction.

Since then, however, I’ve become much more attached to the McDowellian and Travisian view that attempts to combine fallibilism with the idea that if one knows something, one cannot be wrong. Not just because of the facticity of knowledge but because of the luck-eliminating exclusion of counter-factual possibilities. Given that their view is an action at a distance of Oxford Realism, my sick-leave project is to rethink On Certainty through the conceptual spectacles of Oxford Realism.

I am, however, still at the personal archaeological stage and hence looking at the sources I recall liking. At the top of the list is Norman Malcolm’s ‘Wittgenstein: The relation of language to instinctive behaviour’ (Malcolm 1982).

Malcolm’s main theme is that language is grafted onto primitive, animal behaviour. Malcom takes this to contrast a cognitivist or representationalist view, citing Chomsky and Fodor. This takes up the first 5 sections of the 12 section paper. In §6 he describes Moore’s comments about being certain that he has clothes on and then that he knows this. He quotes Moore thus:

How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case! You might as well suggest that I do not know that I am now standing up and talking - that perhaps after all I’m not, and that it’s not quite certain that I am! (Moore 1959: 146-147). (Malcolm 1982: 12)

In §7, Malcolm sets out his account of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moore. It includes:

If Moore had declared to his audience that he did not have clothes on, was not standing up, did not have two hands, etc., the people there would have regarded him not as mistaken, but as mentally disturbed (OC 155). Why is this? Apparently because we expect an adult speaker of the language, who is in possession of his faculties, to be able in normal circumstances, to say straight off, without looking for evidence, whether he has clothes on, or whether he is sitting or standing.
This helps to bring out the fact that Moore is wrong in saying that he knows these things. For when a person contends that he is not merely convinced of something but knows it to be so, we expect him to be able to produce evidence in support of this distinction. But Moore was in no position to do this. As Wittgenstein says, if what a person believes ‘is of such a kind that the grounds which he can give are no surer than his assertion, then he cannot say that he knows what he believes’ (OC243). (ibid: 13)

The first part of this quotation reiterates Moore’s unexceptional certainty about himself and his state of dress. But the second part moves to suggest that Moore does not know this, opening up a gap between knowledge and certainty which forms a key part of what I tended to say about OC. That’s how I took this, 30 years ago. But now it seems to me that something else has also been introduced: that Moore is wrong to say he knows this. Malcolm says: When a person contends that he knows something to be so, we expect him to be able to produce evidence in support of this. But Moore was in no position to do so.

A little later Malcolm says:

The case is exactly the same here as with Moore’s assertion, ‘I know that that’s a tree’, which he reiterated in philosophical discussion. Wittgenstein said of this: ‘I know that that’s a tree’. Why does it strike me as if I did not understand the sentence?, though it is after all an extremely simple sentence of the most ordinary kind?... As soon as I think of an everyday use of the sentence instead of a philosophical one, its meaning becomes clear and ordinary (OC 347). Outside of ordinary contexts neither ‘I am certain’ nor ‘It is certain’ (that I have two hands) has a clear meaning. (ibid: 14)

Again the focus is on saying ‘I know’. Note also the immediate connection to certainty. ‘I am certain’ is treated here as akin to ‘I know’. But in this case Malcom continues with:

Nor can a person who is going about his affairs in ordinary life be said to assume, or take for granted, or presuppose, that he has two hands. (ibid: 14)

But this seems to me an entirely separate matter and not obviously true. Why can we not say that such a person ‘takes for granted’ his having hands? Of course, we will need a context in which this will be a sensible thing to say. But perhaps just this piece of philosophical anthropology is that context. A person may check some thing but not others. It may not come as news to anyone on Earth that an ordinary person, albeit a Cambridge philosopher, does not generally check that they have hands. But that fact itself may be interesting in a piece of philosophical anthropology, as a reminder of something always before us. Malcolm seems – precisely – to be interested in this, in this very paper.

Later Malcolm adds:

Wittgenstein says: ‘I would like to reserve the expression “I know” for the cases in which it is used in normal linguistic exchange’ (OC 260). Of course the same should hold for ‘I believe’, ‘I am certain’, ‘I agree’, ‘I assume’, and also ‘I do not doubt’. (ibid: 18)

Note again that this concerns first person present tense avowals, not underlying states of knowledge. Note also that there is an immediate link to ‘I am certain’. There is no distinction here between ‘I know’ and ‘I am certain’ with respect to reserving their first person present tense uses to the uses in ordinary circumstances (a critical remark against Moore but not yet telling). 

The underlying theme of Malcom’s paper is the absence of doubt that underlies the use of words and which Malcolm suggests characterises hinge propositions. He argues that it is difficult to articulate because, in some sense, it cannot be put into words.

Wittgenstein conceives of the absence of doubt that exists at so many points in the daily course of our lives, as not something ‘hasty or superficial’ but as ‘something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal’ (OC 358,359). It is too fundamental to be either ‘unjustified’ or ‘justified’. It underlies any mastery of words in which a procedure of justification could be framed. This fundamental thing is so fundamental that it is difficult, or perhaps impossible, to describe it in words. One would like to characterize it in mental terms - to call it knowledge, or belief, or conviction, or certainty, or acceptance, or confidence, or assumption. But none of these expressions fit. All of them have their appropriate application within various language-games. Whereas Wittgenstein is trying to call attention to something that underlies all language-games. But can’t one give a characterization at least in negative terms of this fundamental thing? Wittgenstein attempts this in many passages. A formulation he frequently resorts to is ‘the absence of doubt’. (ibid: 17-18)

There are indications in On Certainty that Wittgenstein is dissatisfied with every attempt to characterize this fact that is so fundamental to language, thought and action. Suppose that a customer tells a greengrocer that he wants ten apples, and the shopkeeper proceeds to count them out. Wittgenstein says:
If the shopkeeper wanted to investigate each of his apples without any reason, in order to play safe, why doesn’t he have to investigate the investigation? And can one speak here of belief (I mean belief as in religious belief, not conjecture)? Here all psychological terms merely lead us away from the main thing (OC 459)
In order to have ‘absolute certainty’ must not the shopkeeper try to determine not only that these things are apples, but also that what he is doing is trying to find out whether they are apples, and in addition that he is really counting them? And if the shopkeeper doesn’t do this, is this because he ‘believes’, or ‘knows’, or is ‘certain’, or is ‘convinced’, or ‘assumes’, or ‘has no doubt’, that these are apples and that he is counting them? No. All psychological terms, says Wittgenstein, lead us away from ‘the main thing’ (die Hauptsache). (ibid: 19)

Hence a connection back to the saying vs. showing distinction that seems to be found in the Tractatus (‘seems’ because of the ongoing debate as to whether it is voiced in propria persona).

Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it (OC501).
Logic cannot be described! I take this to mean that it is not appropriate for Wittgenstein to say either that he ‘knows’, or ‘believes’, or is ‘certain’, or is ‘convinced’, or ‘assumes’, or ‘does not doubt’, that his name is L. W., or that this is called a ‘hand’, or that the law of induction is true. None of these terms are correct. What does it mean to say: ‘You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it’? What do you see? Well, you see the unhesitating behaviour with which a person signs his name at the end of a letter or gives his name to a bank clerk; or uses the word ‘hand’ in statements; or makes inductive inferences; or does calculations; and so on.
What you see is this unhesitating way of acting. This is the ‘logic’ of language that cannot be described with psychological words. It is too ‘primitive’, too ‘instinctive’, for that. It is behaviour that is like the squirrel’s gathering nuts or the cat’s watching a mouse hole. This is why Wittgenstein says it is something animal (OC359). (ibid: 19-20)

Again, however, Malcolm thinks there is a difficulty in putting something into words. In this case, his own attempt to describe the absence of doubt that, he thinks, underpins Wittgenstein’s account.

Just now I have spoken of this human behaviour as ‘unhesitating’, and previously as ‘confident’. But isn’t this a strained use of these words? When I sign my name to a cheque in the normal way, is it correct to say that I do it ‘confidently’ or ‘without hesitation’? It seems not. If, with advancing senility, I sometimes forgot my name, or sometimes write it unconfidently, then an observer could report of me, ‘This time he wrote his name confidently, without any hesitation’. Or if I had been given a drug that is supposed to produce amnesia, an observer might report, with surprise, ‘Why, he stated his name quite confidently!’ But the way in which a normal adult normally comes out with his own name and with the names of familiar objects, cannot be called either ‘confident’ or ‘unconfident’, ‘hesitating’ or ‘unhesitating’. (ibid: 20)

Malcolm is surely right to say that in these latter specific contexts concerning senility or being drugged, it would make sense to describe an action as ‘confident’ or ‘unhesitating’ and that, in other ordinary circumstances, the very same fluency of action would not call for these descriptions. The attempt to compliment one’s partner as they signed their signature in ordinary circumstances using one of these words would likely backfire.

But it is not clear that there is no context here to use these words in Malcolm’s attempt to describe normal doubt-free action.

I think that this point generalises to Malcolm’s comments about Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moore saying that he knew he was clothed. Without some appropriate context, such an avowal is otiose. It is unclear what Moore would be saying. Equally, without some context, it is unclear what is being said in the case of a philosopher saying, of a tree before them, that ‘that is a tree’ or ‘I know that that is a tree’. But it does not follow that the same philosopher does not know that it is a tree. His knowing that it is a tree might be cited in evidence against him if his defence depended on there having been no tall objects in the vicinity. The opposing barrister might say: ‘You could hardly have failed to spot the tree in front of you in good light and clear weather?!? So you could hardly have failed to know that there was indeed a tall tree available for your nefarious purposes?!? Your defence that you did not know this is a tissue of lies!’

Nor does it follow that Moore’s certainty is not the certainty of knowledge. In normal circumstances and when in full view of a partner it would be bizarre to say ‘I am wearing clothes’ or ‘I know that I am wearing clothes’. But it does not follow that one does not know that one is wearing clothes. It just does not require stating.

Malcom suggests that ‘when a person contends that he is not merely convinced of something but knows it to be so, we expect him to be able to produce evidence in support of this distinction’. Moore himself acknowledged that there was nothing he could do to establish or to prove his having two hands. He shares Wittgenstein’s view that nothing, in normal circumstances, could be used to establish this because nothing would have better credentials. He differs from Wittgenstein and Malcolm in not thinking that this disbars this as knowledge. So how plausible is Malcolm’s claim (on Wittgenstein’s behalf)? 

Note, first, that it concerns the use of the avowal ‘I know’ rather then whether knowledge is in play and so it offers no support to the point at hand (whether Moore knows, not whether his saying ‘I know’ has a clear sense). But, second, even as a comment on avowals it seems wrong. While one may be convinced of something but not know it (because of the facticity of knowledge) to say that one is convinced of something but that one does not know it sounds very strange. Eschewing knowledge implies a lack of conviction. Avowing conviction implies that one takes oneself to know (whether or not correctly).

In sum, although I didn’t think this 30 years ago, it now seems to me that Malcolm makes awfully heavy weather of all this. The difficulties that resolute readers of Wittgenstein highlight concerning whether one has actually said anything by simply asserting the word string ‘I know…’ without suitable circumstances and an intelligible purpose do not carry over third person ascriptions of knowledge or third person ascriptions of an absence of doubt. Malcolm’s very success in outlining a philosophical context enables his own third person descriptions to carry a content even as he disowns it. And nothing shows the falsity of the idea that Moore knows these things even if his own avowal fails.

(Moore 1; Wittgenstein 1; Malcolm 0)

References

Malcolm, N. (1982) ‘Wittgenstein: The relation of language to instinctive behaviour’ Philosophical Investigations, 5: 3-22