Friday, 11 June 2021

First thoughts on starting to read Annalis Coliva’s Moore and Wittgenstein

I’ve been reading Annalis Coliva’s excellent book on Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense (2010). The discussion of Moore in chapter 1 seems very helpful. In chapter 2, however, I’m torn between admiring the clear exposition of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and a sneaking feeling that she subscribes to one aspect of the sort of thing I used to say about On Certainty and now feel uncomfortable with. My hunch is that she has a relaxed construal of knowledge which resembles something like a true belief based on a good enough reason. Further, I think this is motivated by focusing too much on the claim ‘I know’. Spotting that that is fallible – one can claim to know when one does not know – she then locates the fallibility too closely, I fear, with the state of knowledge itself rather than with its first person self-ascription. Still I'm early in the book and may be quite wrong or, equally, later persuaded.

For example, is the following merely a slip or is it significant? First she quotes On Certainty and then picks up a line of thought. 

According to Wittgenstein, here are some examples of the correct use of ‘I know’:...

Someone with bad sight asks me: ‘do you believe that the thing we can see there is a tree?’ I reply ‘I know it is; I can see it clearly and am familiar with it’. – A: ‘Is N. N. at home?’ – I: ‘I believe he is.’ – A: ‘Was he at home yesterday?’ – I: ‘Yesterday he was – I know he was; I spoke to him.’ – A: ‘Do you know or only believe that this part of the house was built on later than the rest?’ – I: ‘I know it is; I got it from so and so’. (OC 483)

In these cases, then, one says ‘I know’ and mentions how one knows [das Grund], or at least one can do so. (OC 484) (Coliva 2010: 62)

A paragraph later she is able to offer the description and conclusion she wants which runs:

[T]he fact that in general our use of ‘to know’ in the first person present be made on the basis of grounds – whatever they contextually happen to be – is a criterion for saying that that use of ‘I know’ was meaningful though, perhaps, mistaken. Thus, if I had talked to NN’s twin brother this would (probably) falsify the claim that NN was at home and would (certainly) show that I did not know, but only believed to have talked to him. My claim ‘I know that NN was at home yesterday’ would thus be false, but my use of ‘I know’ would not be nonsensical. By contrast, if I claimed to know that NN was at home yesterday but if I were unable to offer reasons in favour of such a claim, that would show that I misused the expression ‘I know’. (ibid: 62-3)

A condition on the ordinary use of ‘I know’ – she says – is that one is able to offer grounds. But one may be in error, or merely not know, if, for example, the grounds offered fail, for example if one has mistaken his twin brother for NN. But the passage just before that gets her to this conclusion runs:

Let us consider the second of Wittgenstein’s examples from the above mentioned quotation. The fact that I talked to NN yesterday and offer it as my ground for saying that I know he was at home is a criterion for the correct assertion ‘I know that…’. A criterion is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for knowledge that p. For, clearly, I could have talked to NN’s twin brother, and NN could have been at home while I had no conversation with him. (ibid: 62 both italics added)

Here Coliva seems to think that the fact that I talked to NN fails to act as sufficient grounds for the claim to knowledge because – for all I know, let’s assume - I could have talked instead to NN’s twin brother. That possibility of error implies, she says, that actually talking to NN is merely a criterion on the model of criteria where they are neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. But with no other undermining circumstances described, why is (the fact of) talking to NN at his home not sufficient for knowing him to have been at home? 

This seems to hint at a highest common factor of experience in which one could never take in the fact of talking to NN – because it is possible to confuse NN and his twin – and hence the invocation of that fact as grounds for a knowledge claim should be interpreted merely as a highest common factor analogue. Not the full fact as she actually states it but that merely under an interpretation of what it shares with talking to his twin brother: seeming to talk to NN (or his twin). (Of course, it does change things if his twin lives with NN and I know that I cannot tell them apart. In that case the fact of seeing NN rather than, as it happens and by luck, his twin cannot impress itself on me and hence my capacity for knowledge is undermined. But none of this has been specified.)

This looks like the difficulty I’ve seen elsewhere of drawing conclusions for knowledge from the fallibility of claims expressed via ‘I know…’.

Here’s a longer passage a little later from pp74-6. Coliva here follows Wittgenstein so my qualms may be with him rather than her. But she does endorse the view that emerges. I will intersperse lengthy quotation with my comments.

Wittgenstein, as we saw in §2.2, thinks that ‘the difference between the concept “knowing” and the concept of “being certain” isn’t of any great importance at all’ except, however, ‘where “I know” is meant to mean: I can’t be wrong’ (OC 8). When we say that we are certain ‘we express complete conviction, the total absence of doubt, and thereby we seek to convince other people. That is subjective certainty’ (OC 194, cf. 245, 415). But – asks Wittgenstein – ‘when is something objectively certain?’ (ibid. my italics); and answers, ‘When a mistake is not possible’ (ibid.). That is to say, when the possibility of being mistaken is ‘logically excluded’ (cf. ibid. my italics). (Coliva 2010: 74-5)

So knowing and being certain are not substantially different except in this context though note that it is still explored via an ‘I know’ claim (rather than, eg., looking at when we might properly ascribe knowledge in the third person). When ‘I know’ is meant to mean: I cannot be wrong, then there is a difference. It would be good to know what this is.

Well when we say ‘I am certain’ that expresses, she says, complete conviction, the total absence of doubt. So that sounds to be equivalent of saying ‘I cannot be wrong’. So that sounds just the same as the use of ‘I know’ we’ve just had to mean the same thing: I cannot be wrong. Hence I’m confused.

The passage from Wittgenstein continues with the distinction of subjective and objective certainty. My hunch is that subjective certainty is a status that applies to the claims ‘I know’ and ‘I am certain’ - both expressive of the total absence of doubt - whether or not they are true. That is, one is subjectively certain if one claims knowledge falsely. We might say: although Jones was certain, in his own mind, he turned out not to know and, in fact, to be quite wrong. (There is no equivalent: subjectively know, ie. falsely.) Objective certainty applies to a combination of subjective certainty and the idea that mistake is actually not possible.

Given that subjective certainty did not deliver the promised distinction between knowing and being certain, is the idea that a distinction enters only with objective certainty? This would falsify the initial too wide claim but understandably so. But if so it implies that Wittgenstein and Coliva hold that knowledge is compatible with some possibility of being wrong: being right though one might have been wrong; being right though only by luck. But that seems to me to undermine the very idea of knowledge. 

Note that it is perfectly possible, as above, that the claim ‘I know’ is false but here we seem to be talking about knowledge itself not merely false claims to have it. She continues:

At another place, however, he writes,

‘Knowledge’ and ‘certainty’ belong to different categories. They are not two ‘mental states’ like, say ‘surmising’ and ‘being sure’ (…). What interests us now is not being sure but knowledge. That is, we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is to be possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one. (OC 308)

But, as we saw in §2.2, sometimes ‘I am certain’ can occur in place of ‘I know’, and yet, Wittgenstein now says, ‘I know’ doesn’t express a subjective conviction. (ibid: 75)

This is puzzling assuming - possibly utterly wrongly - my approach above. I’d like to say that ‘I know’ expresses (it does not ensure) a (hence fallible) claim to objective certainty though we might – on the suggestion above – ascribe to the person ‘subjective certainty’ should they prove to be in error about the facts. Perhaps the latter could be flagged as indicated. The sincere claim expresses an objective claim about the world that may prove false and indicates that the speaker holds it with great conviction, which still holds even if they are wrong about the world. I am yet to see why this is helpful, however.

This makes it puzzling to see how for Wittgenstein ‘I am certain’ can express a subjective conviction and thus a mental state. In the contexts in which ‘I know’ can be substituted by ‘I am certain’, I suggest to interpret both these claims as in fact equivalent to the following one: ‘for all I know, things are thus- and-so’. For this last assertion makes clearer how my certainty is here a function of the information, evidence and grounds I have in favour of a given hypothesis. This, however, doesn’t guarantee that things are as I – with good right – claim them to be. Thus, one can say that my certainty is subjective, as it is a function of a subject’s state of information. (ibid: 75)

There seems to be something strange and very wrong about glossing the sincere claims ‘I know’ or ‘I am certain’ as for all I know, things are thus-and-so. If someone says that, then they ought to withdraw the claim ‘I know’ or ‘I am certain. Unless it is an empty philosophical musing, ‘for all I know’ undermines the claim of either. Lots of sentences about cultural practice in distant countries can follow my own use of ‘For all I know’ and none of them are then knowledge (they would be mostly false, even).

This doesn’t mean that the claim ‘I am certain’ would somehow be arbitrary and whimsical. Simply, my certainty doesn’t exclude the possibility of error: I could have overlooked or misinterpreted some evidence and wrongly taken it to support ‘p’; or else, I could fail to have some decisive piece of evidence against it. (ibid: 75)

To the contrary, I am inclined to say that the previous suggestion about ‘for all I know’ really does make the follow up claim ‘I am certain’ arbitrary and whimsical! It ought to be withdrawn immediately by a competent speaker. The rest of this seems, again, to ignore the difference between what is claimed and what might prove to be the case. ‘I know’ is fallible. Again, I suspect the problem comes from looking at first person rather than third person ascriptions.

So, we can make sense of Wittgenstein’s claim that, in this case, one’s certainty would be subjective. Yet, can we also make sense of his claim that it would then be a mental state? After all, it won’t differ from knowledge and Wittgenstein, as we saw in §2.1, stressed the fact that knowledge isn’t a mental state. He writes,

One may for example call ‘mental state’ what is expressed by tone of voice in speaking, by gestures etc. It would thus be possible to speak of a mental state of conviction, and that may be the same whether it is knowledge or false belief. (OC 42)

I think that the kind of certainty Wittgenstein dubs ‘subjective’ isn’t itself a mental state, just as knowledge isn’t, for him, but that it can be accompanied by a particular ‘mental state of conviction’, that can be manifested in the tone of voice and in one’s manners. That there be such aspects of ‘tone’ and that there be also a particular mental state of conviction – a special feeling, as it were – is entirely plausible, from a phenomenological point of view. This, however, doesn’t exclude the possibility of error. I may feel as certain as ever of having taken my keys this morning when I left home, and yet find out later that I didn’t. A particular feeling is not a sufficient condition (nor a necessary one) for the truth of the hypothesis one claims to be certain about, as it could occur both when one really knows that p and ‘p’ is thus the case and when one doesn’t know it because in fact ‘p’ isn’t the case. So one’s claim to be (subjectively) certain and its accompanying feelings of total conviction don’t guarantee the impossibility of being mistaken. (ibid: 75-6)

This seems to be making unnecessarily heavy weather of the fact that claims to know are fallible. But the suggestion somehow lurking here that one might self ascribe knowledge – in an ‘I know’ claim – via introspection of feelings of certainty seems bizarre. She says: A particular feeling is not a sufficient condition (nor a necessary one) for the truth of the hypothesis one claims to be certain about. Who knew? But without that bizarre idea, I am not sure what this paragraph claims. Note that one would not normally claim to be subjectively certain unless, perhaps, one realises that one has taken a drug and has become unreliable. One might, perhaps, say: I am weirdly subjectively certain about facts I couldn't possibly know so please ignore me.

Wittgenstein, therefore, isn’t interested in this kind of certainty [TT: a good thing too since it seems silly], nor, in this case, in the use of ‘I know’ within our usual language games, where it can be substituted by ‘I am certain/sure’. Rather, he wishes to clarify that peculiar use of ‘I know’ which is a synonym of ‘I can’t be wrong’ and which expresses objective certainty (OC 569). (ibid: 76)

But didn’t we have this assimilation earlier applied to subjective certainty? Perhaps not if the conjunction is played up. That is, he is interested in the use of ‘I know’ not just where it can be substituted by ‘I am certain/sure’ but where, in addition to that substitution, it actually also possesses objective certainty. If so, though, the word ‘express’ is in the wrong place. ‘I know’ expresses, fallibly, a claim to objective certainty. But also: surely this just means cases where one’s knowledge or certainty claim successfully excludes the possibility of mistake. And that still does not distinguish knowledge and certainty.

Still, I've two chapters to go and it may be that the butler really does it. I post this mainly in the hope of getting quick corrections to my email address.

Coliva, A. (2010) Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense, Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan

Monday, 7 June 2021

Closure vs underdetermination versions of scepticism

One of the things that confused me while reading Duncan Pritchard’s book Epistemic Angst is the distinction between closure-based and underdetermination-based versions of scepticism. I could see the overall architecture of the ‘output’ of this distinction but not the distinction itself. An instance of the former is given in a footnote of Pritchard’s paper ‘In defence of closure’.

I think the real anti-sceptical import of epistemological disjunctivism lies in responding to what I call underdetermination-based radical scepticism, which turns on a difference epistemic principle to closure, and generates what I claim is a logically distinct radical sceptical argument. See Pritchard (2015, parts 1 & 3) for the details. (Pritchard forthcoming fn 18)

In the book, the need for distinct approaches to the distinct sources of scepticism is summarised in passages such as this.

Although the ultimate skeptical import of the universality of rational evaluation thesis and the insularity of reasons thesis is the same, it is important to note that they pose distinct epistemological challenges. Suppose, for example, that one rejected the universality of rational evaluation thesis and therefore argued that there are in principle limitations on the scope of rational evaluation. In this way, one could argue that closureRK-based inferences need to be restricted in some way to prevent them from taking the subject from local to global rational evaluations. One could thus undermine the closureRK-based radical skeptical paradox. In particular, one could hold that one’s rationally grounded knowledge of everyday propositions—as far as this formulation of the skeptical paradox goes at any rate—is entirely compatible with a lack of rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses (on account of the fact that one cannot employ a closureRK-based inference in order to claim that one’s rationally grounded knowledge of everyday propositions, if genuine, would entail the contested rationally grounded anti-skeptical knowledge).

It is far from obvious how that would help one resolve the problem posed by the insularity of reasons thesis, however. That one can have rationally grounded knowledge of mundane external world propositions while lacking rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses is one thing; that one can have adequately rationally grounded knowledge of mundane external world propositions when that rational basis (one is aware) does not favor one’s everyday beliefs over skeptical alternatives quite another. As one might put the point, if one’s everyday beliefs do not satisfy the underdeterminationRK principle, then in virtue of what, exactly, do they amount to rationally grounded knowledge? Thus, even with the closureRK principle out of (skeptical) action, one can still employ the underdeterminationRK principle—and, thereby, the insularity of reasons thesis—to motivate a radical skeptical conclusion.

So the general picture is this. Part of the originality of Pritchard’s view is that there are two sources of scepticism, which thus need two distinct treatments. For closure based scepticism, the treatment is an account of hinge epistemology (blocking the effects of closure). For underdetermination, he appeals to disjunctivism. That seems plausible enough, but I’m still not sure what the different sources are. These are each outlined in the first two chapters, one on each. In each case, a principle – closure or underdetermination – is used to generate an argument for scepticism and then an incompatible triad of prima facie plausible claims. And in each chapter, there’s a version of the principle and the argument that stresses an internalist, rationalist approach. For speed, I’ll simply give the quotes hoping that this outline is enough to explain what they are doing.

The Closure Principle
If S knows that p, and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby forming a belief that q on this basis while retaining her knowledge that p, then S knows that q.…

The Radical Skeptical Paradox (I)
(S11) One cannot know that one is not a BIV.
(S12) If one cannot know that one is not a BIV, then one cannot know that E.
(S13) One knows that E.…

[T]he epistemic externalist is keen to break the logical link between knowledge and rational support, such that one can have the former without the latter, they surely do not wish to disengage our everyday knowledge from rational support altogether. Or, at least, the skeptic can force a dilemma here. On the first horn of the dilemma is the charge that the epistemic externalist is ultimately offering no response at all to the skeptical problem. On the second horn is the charge that the epistemic externalist is presenting us with an epistemological proposal that is so revisionist, so discontinuous with our ordinary epistemic practices, that even the most ardent proponent of epistemic externalism would find it unpalatable.…

The ClosureRK Principle
If S has rationally grounded knowledge that p, and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby forming a belief that q on this basis while retaining her rationally grounded knowledge that p, then S has rationally grounded knowledge that q.…

The Radical Skeptical Paradox (II)
(S21) One cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV.
(S22) If one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV, then one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that E.
(S33) One has rationally grounded knowledge that E.…

The Inconsistent Radical Skeptical Triad
(I) One is unable to know the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses.10
(II) The closure principle.
(III) One has widespread everyday knowledge.…

The Underdetermination Principle
If S knows that p and q describe incompatible scenarios, and yet S lacks a rational basis that favors p over q, then S lacks knowledge that p.…

The Radical Skeptical Paradox (III)
(S31) One cannot have rational support that favors one’s belief that E over the BIV hypothesis.
(S32) If one cannot have rational support that favors one’s belief that E over the BIV hypothesis, then one does not know that E.
(S33) One knows that E.…

The UnderdeterminationRK Principle
If S knows that p and q describe incompatible scenarios, and yet S lacks a rational basis that favors p over q, then S lacks rationally grounded knowledge that p.…

The Radical Skeptical Paradox (IV)
(S41) One cannot have rational support that favors one’s belief that E over the BIV hypothesis.
(S42) If one cannot have rational support that favors one’s belief that E over the BIV hypothesis, then one does not have rationally grounded knowledge that E.
(S43) One has rationally grounded knowledge that E.…

The Inconsistent Radical Skeptical Triad**
(I**) One cannot have rational support that favors one’s belief in an everyday proposition over an incompatible radical skeptical hypothesis.
(II**) The underdetermination principle.
(III**) One has widespread everyday knowledge.

My confusion is that these seem very closely related sources of scepticism. It is not, for example, akin to the wide difference between Agrippan and Cartesian scepticism.

Now this does not help with Pritchard’s view, but it is interesting to look (at the suggestion of my ex-co-author) at Anthony Brueckner’s paper ‘The Structure of the Skeptical Argument’.

Brueckner sets out the argument for scepticism using material similar to Pritchard’s triad (give or take a NOT) starting with closure; then that we do not know the negation of the ringer; then that we do not know everyday claims.

(1A) If I know that P. then I know that -SK.
(2A) I do not know that -SK.
(3A) I do not know that P.

This is a first stab at codifying the argument. Closure is there as a big general premise but then, equally necessary, is the minor premise that we do not know the negation of the ringer. From that scepticism about everyday matters follows. But why don’t we know the negation of the ringer? For this, Brueckner invokes underdetermination. So the fuller argument is underpinned by two principles: Closure with respect to justification (CIJ) and also underdetermination (UP). Both are in play for the same argument.

(CIJ) For all S φ, ψ, if S has justification for believing that φ, and (φ → ψ), then S has justification for believing that ψ.

(UP) For all S, φ, ψ, if S’s evidence for believing that φ does not favor φ over some incompatible hypothesis ψ, then S lacks justification for believing that φ.
This underdetermination principle helps establish the result that I lack justification for believing that -SK.

This gives the fuller codification of external world scepticism thus:

(1B) If I have justification for believing that P, then I have justification for believing that -SK. [from (CIJ)]
(2B) If my evidence for believing that -SK does not favor -SK over SK, then I lack justification for believing that -SK. [from (UP)]
(3B) My evidence for believing that -SK (my sensory evidence) does not favor -SK over SK. [premise] (4B) I lack justification for believing that -SK. [from 2B, 3B]
(5B) I lack justification for believing that P. [from 1B, 4B]
(6B) I do not know that P. [from 5B]

This makes much more sense to me than Pritchard’s approach. In fact, however, Brueckner goes on first to compare underdetermination and closure and argue that they are very similar and then to reconstruct the whole argument using underdetermination alone as a kind of ‘uber’ principle. Here’s the former.

What is the difference, if any, between argument B's two underlying epistemic principles, viz. the underdetermination principle and the principle that justification is closed under entailment? It is helpful to consider the following principle, which is equivalent to (UP):
(UP') For all S, φ, ψ, if one has justification for believing that φ, and φ and ψ are incompatible, then one's evidence for believing that φ favors φ over ψ.
Now consider a principle which is equivalent to (CIJ'):
(CIJ") For all S, φ, ψ, if one has justification for believing that φ, and φ and ψ are incompatible, then one has justification for believing that -ψ.
(CIJ’') and (UP') share a common antecedent, but their consequents differ. Suppose that S has justification for believing that φ and suppose that ψ is a competing incompatible hypothesis. According to (CIJ"), S then has justification for rejecting ψ. According to (UP'), what follows from the supposition is that S's evidence for φ favors φ over ψ. What is the difference be- tween these two putative necessary conditions for S's justification for believing that φ? (CIJ") says nothing about S's evidence for believing that φ, thereby leaving it open that S's justification for φ is not evidentially based. Then S could have justification for believing both φ and -ψ without having evidence which favors φ over ψ. But in cases in which S's justification for φ is so based, do the principles differ? If (CIJ") were restricted to evidentially justified φs, then it seems that the resultant principle would be virtually equivalent to (UP').

Here’s the latter.

(1C) If my evidence for believing that P does not favor P over SK, then I lack justification for believing that P. [from (UP)]
(2C) My evidence for believing that P (my sensory evidence) does not favor P over SK. [premise]
(3C) I lack justification for believing that P. [from IC, 2C]
(4C) I do not know that P. [from 3C]

So my worry, in a nutshell, is that even without Brueckner’s reconstruction of closure in terms of underdetermination, I’m not sure that we have two forms of scepticism – akin to the distinction in kind between Agrippan and Cartesian, for example – as opposed to one codification with two underlying premises and hence two different potential points of attack for an anti-sceptic. One could attack closure – and hence the spread of the sceptical infection from a sceptical ringer back to everyday claims – or one could attack the efficacy of the sceptical ringer. If they are not distinct forms of scepticism, in the way Pritchard argues, there is no need for two simultaneous treatments. Hence the main selling point for his book looks rather odd.

(Then again, having just had my second AstraZeneca vaccine dose, I wouldn’t say no if offered the Pfizer as well.)

References

Brueckner, A. (1994) ‘The Structure of the Skeptical Argument’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 827-835

Pritchard, D.H. (2019) Epistemic angst: Radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pritchard, D.H. (forthcoming) ‘In defence of closure’ in Jope, M. Pritchard, D.H. (eds.) New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure, London: Routledge.

Friday, 4 June 2021

Norman Malcolm’s ‘Wittgenstein: The relation of language to instinctive behaviour’

As well as advising a UCLan philosophy student on his dissertation, my reason for returning to read the literature around On Certainty (OC) is one of those periodic realisations that a change of view in one area forces a change elsewhere. I realised that my quick summary, the sort of thing I used to say, at least on my previous interpretation of it, won’t do as an endorsing account of On Certainty.

The sort of thing I tend to say is that OC is radical because LW separates the game of giving and asking for reasons, of knowledge and doubt, from certainty. A framework of both animal and inherited certainty is the condition of possibility of knowledge claims and also of claims to doubt since doubts, too, take work and a context to make them reasonable. (On this, I like to remind myself that claiming that one didn’t know one’s suspiciously suddenly dead partner’s bank balance will not get waved through as it might in an epistemology class. One can be assumed to have picked up knowledge - rubbing off on one like an infectious disease - unless there is good reason why not.)

But implicit in my own past understanding of the sort of thing I tend to say was the idea that not only was knowledge distinct from the sort of certainties that plays a role in OC – let’s follow the literature and call them ‘hinge propositions’ – but that knowledge itself wasn’t certain. I thought this, if I am honest now, because I wasn’t much interested in epistemology and so had never really thought about any necessary conditions one could offer for knowledge (even if one eschews illuminating sufficient conditions). I suspect I subscribed implicitly to some sort of JTB analysis of knowledge and simply accepted that the justification condition didn’t need to be very strong. Reliabilism was sadly rife in the department in which I did my PhD (Cambridge HPS) and so perhaps this persuaded me in the same direction.

Since then, however, I’ve become much more attached to the McDowellian and Travisian view that attempts to combine fallibilism with the idea that if one knows something, one cannot be wrong. Not just because of the facticity of knowledge but because of the luck-eliminating exclusion of counter-factual possibilities. Given that their view is an action at a distance of Oxford Realism, my sick-leave project is to rethink On Certainty through the conceptual spectacles of Oxford Realism.

I am, however, still at the personal archaeological stage and hence looking at the sources I recall liking. At the top of the list is Norman Malcolm’s ‘Wittgenstein: The relation of language to instinctive behaviour’ (Malcolm 1982).

Malcolm’s main theme is that language is grafted onto primitive, animal behaviour. Malcom takes this to contrast a cognitivist or representationalist view, citing Chomsky and Fodor. This takes up the first 5 sections of the 12 section paper. In §6 he describes Moore’s comments about being certain that he has clothes on and then that he knows this. He quotes Moore thus:

How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case! You might as well suggest that I do not know that I am now standing up and talking - that perhaps after all I’m not, and that it’s not quite certain that I am! (Moore 1959: 146-147). (Malcolm 1982: 12)

In §7, Malcolm sets out his account of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moore. It includes:

If Moore had declared to his audience that he did not have clothes on, was not standing up, did not have two hands, etc., the people there would have regarded him not as mistaken, but as mentally disturbed (OC 155). Why is this? Apparently because we expect an adult speaker of the language, who is in possession of his faculties, to be able in normal circumstances, to say straight off, without looking for evidence, whether he has clothes on, or whether he is sitting or standing.
This helps to bring out the fact that Moore is wrong in saying that he knows these things. For when a person contends that he is not merely convinced of something but knows it to be so, we expect him to be able to produce evidence in support of this distinction. But Moore was in no position to do this. As Wittgenstein says, if what a person believes ‘is of such a kind that the grounds which he can give are no surer than his assertion, then he cannot say that he knows what he believes’ (OC243). (ibid: 13)

The first part of this quotation reiterates Moore’s unexceptional certainty about himself and his state of dress. But the second part moves to suggest that Moore does not know this, opening up a gap between knowledge and certainty which forms a key part of what I tended to say about OC. That’s how I took this, 30 years ago. But now it seems to me that something else has also been introduced: that Moore is wrong to say he knows this. Malcolm says: When a person contends that he knows something to be so, we expect him to be able to produce evidence in support of this. But Moore was in no position to do so.

A little later Malcolm says:

The case is exactly the same here as with Moore’s assertion, ‘I know that that’s a tree’, which he reiterated in philosophical discussion. Wittgenstein said of this: ‘I know that that’s a tree’. Why does it strike me as if I did not understand the sentence?, though it is after all an extremely simple sentence of the most ordinary kind?... As soon as I think of an everyday use of the sentence instead of a philosophical one, its meaning becomes clear and ordinary (OC 347). Outside of ordinary contexts neither ‘I am certain’ nor ‘It is certain’ (that I have two hands) has a clear meaning. (ibid: 14)

Again the focus is on saying ‘I know’. Note also the immediate connection to certainty. ‘I am certain’ is treated here as akin to ‘I know’. But in this case Malcom continues with:

Nor can a person who is going about his affairs in ordinary life be said to assume, or take for granted, or presuppose, that he has two hands. (ibid: 14)

But this seems to me an entirely separate matter and not obviously true. Why can we not say that such a person ‘takes for granted’ his having hands? Of course, we will need a context in which this will be a sensible thing to say. But perhaps just this piece of philosophical anthropology is that context. A person may check some thing but not others. It may not come as news to anyone on Earth that an ordinary person, albeit a Cambridge philosopher, does not generally check that they have hands. But that fact itself may be interesting in a piece of philosophical anthropology, as a reminder of something always before us. Malcolm seems – precisely – to be interested in this, in this very paper.

Later Malcolm adds:

Wittgenstein says: ‘I would like to reserve the expression “I know” for the cases in which it is used in normal linguistic exchange’ (OC 260). Of course the same should hold for ‘I believe’, ‘I am certain’, ‘I agree’, ‘I assume’, and also ‘I do not doubt’. (ibid: 18)

Note again that this concerns first person present tense avowals, not underlying states of knowledge. Note also that there is an immediate link to ‘I am certain’. There is no distinction here between ‘I know’ and ‘I am certain’ with respect to reserving their first person present tense uses to the uses in ordinary circumstances (a critical remark against Moore but not yet telling). 

The underlying theme of Malcom’s paper is the absence of doubt that underlies the use of words and which Malcolm suggests characterises hinge propositions. He argues that it is difficult to articulate because, in some sense, it cannot be put into words.

Wittgenstein conceives of the absence of doubt that exists at so many points in the daily course of our lives, as not something ‘hasty or superficial’ but as ‘something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal’ (OC 358,359). It is too fundamental to be either ‘unjustified’ or ‘justified’. It underlies any mastery of words in which a procedure of justification could be framed. This fundamental thing is so fundamental that it is difficult, or perhaps impossible, to describe it in words. One would like to characterize it in mental terms - to call it knowledge, or belief, or conviction, or certainty, or acceptance, or confidence, or assumption. But none of these expressions fit. All of them have their appropriate application within various language-games. Whereas Wittgenstein is trying to call attention to something that underlies all language-games. But can’t one give a characterization at least in negative terms of this fundamental thing? Wittgenstein attempts this in many passages. A formulation he frequently resorts to is ‘the absence of doubt’. (ibid: 17-18)

There are indications in On Certainty that Wittgenstein is dissatisfied with every attempt to characterize this fact that is so fundamental to language, thought and action. Suppose that a customer tells a greengrocer that he wants ten apples, and the shopkeeper proceeds to count them out. Wittgenstein says:
If the shopkeeper wanted to investigate each of his apples without any reason, in order to play safe, why doesn’t he have to investigate the investigation? And can one speak here of belief (I mean belief as in religious belief, not conjecture)? Here all psychological terms merely lead us away from the main thing (OC 459)
In order to have ‘absolute certainty’ must not the shopkeeper try to determine not only that these things are apples, but also that what he is doing is trying to find out whether they are apples, and in addition that he is really counting them? And if the shopkeeper doesn’t do this, is this because he ‘believes’, or ‘knows’, or is ‘certain’, or is ‘convinced’, or ‘assumes’, or ‘has no doubt’, that these are apples and that he is counting them? No. All psychological terms, says Wittgenstein, lead us away from ‘the main thing’ (die Hauptsache). (ibid: 19)

Hence a connection back to the saying vs. showing distinction that seems to be found in the Tractatus (‘seems’ because of the ongoing debate as to whether it is voiced in propria persona).

Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it (OC501).
Logic cannot be described! I take this to mean that it is not appropriate for Wittgenstein to say either that he ‘knows’, or ‘believes’, or is ‘certain’, or is ‘convinced’, or ‘assumes’, or ‘does not doubt’, that his name is L. W., or that this is called a ‘hand’, or that the law of induction is true. None of these terms are correct. What does it mean to say: ‘You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it’? What do you see? Well, you see the unhesitating behaviour with which a person signs his name at the end of a letter or gives his name to a bank clerk; or uses the word ‘hand’ in statements; or makes inductive inferences; or does calculations; and so on.
What you see is this unhesitating way of acting. This is the ‘logic’ of language that cannot be described with psychological words. It is too ‘primitive’, too ‘instinctive’, for that. It is behaviour that is like the squirrel’s gathering nuts or the cat’s watching a mouse hole. This is why Wittgenstein says it is something animal (OC359). (ibid: 19-20)

Again, however, Malcolm thinks there is a difficulty in putting something into words. In this case, his own attempt to describe the absence of doubt that, he thinks, underpins Wittgenstein’s account.

Just now I have spoken of this human behaviour as ‘unhesitating’, and previously as ‘confident’. But isn’t this a strained use of these words? When I sign my name to a cheque in the normal way, is it correct to say that I do it ‘confidently’ or ‘without hesitation’? It seems not. If, with advancing senility, I sometimes forgot my name, or sometimes write it unconfidently, then an observer could report of me, ‘This time he wrote his name confidently, without any hesitation’. Or if I had been given a drug that is supposed to produce amnesia, an observer might report, with surprise, ‘Why, he stated his name quite confidently!’ But the way in which a normal adult normally comes out with his own name and with the names of familiar objects, cannot be called either ‘confident’ or ‘unconfident’, ‘hesitating’ or ‘unhesitating’. (ibid: 20)

Malcolm is surely right to say that in these latter specific contexts concerning senility or being drugged, it would make sense to describe an action as ‘confident’ or ‘unhesitating’ and that, in other ordinary circumstances, the very same fluency of action would not call for these descriptions. The attempt to compliment one’s partner as they signed their signature in ordinary circumstances using one of these words would likely backfire.

But it is not clear that there is no context here to use these words in Malcolm’s attempt to describe normal doubt-free action.

I think that this point generalises to Malcolm’s comments about Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moore saying that he knew he was clothed. Without some appropriate context, such an avowal is otiose. It is unclear what Moore would be saying. Equally, without some context, it is unclear what is being said in the case of a philosopher saying, of a tree before them, that ‘that is a tree’ or ‘I know that that is a tree’. But it does not follow that the same philosopher does not know that it is a tree. His knowing that it is a tree might be cited in evidence against him if his defence depended on there having been no tall objects in the vicinity. The opposing barrister might say: ‘You could hardly have failed to spot the tree in front of you in good light and clear weather?!? So you could hardly have failed to know that there was indeed a tall tree available for your nefarious purposes?!? Your defence that you did not know this is a tissue of lies!’

Nor does it follow that Moore’s certainty is not the certainty of knowledge. In normal circumstances and when in full view of a partner it would be bizarre to say ‘I am wearing clothes’ or ‘I know that I am wearing clothes’. But it does not follow that one does not know that one is wearing clothes. It just does not require stating.

Malcom suggests that ‘when a person contends that he is not merely convinced of something but knows it to be so, we expect him to be able to produce evidence in support of this distinction’. Moore himself acknowledged that there was nothing he could do to establish or to prove his having two hands. He shares Wittgenstein’s view that nothing, in normal circumstances, could be used to establish this because nothing would have better credentials. He differs from Wittgenstein and Malcolm in not thinking that this disbars this as knowledge. So how plausible is Malcolm’s claim (on Wittgenstein’s behalf)? 

Note, first, that it concerns the use of the avowal ‘I know’ rather then whether knowledge is in play and so it offers no support to the point at hand (whether Moore knows, not whether his saying ‘I know’ has a clear sense). But, second, even as a comment on avowals it seems wrong. While one may be convinced of something but not know it (because of the facticity of knowledge) to say that one is convinced of something but that one does not know it sounds very strange. Eschewing knowledge implies a lack of conviction. Avowing conviction implies that one takes oneself to know (whether or not correctly).

In sum, although I didn’t think this 30 years ago, it now seems to me that Malcolm makes awfully heavy weather of all this. The difficulties that resolute readers of Wittgenstein highlight concerning whether one has actually said anything by simply asserting the word string ‘I know…’ without suitable circumstances and an intelligible purpose do not carry over third person ascriptions of knowledge or third person ascriptions of an absence of doubt. Malcolm’s very success in outlining a philosophical context enables his own third person descriptions to carry a content even as he disowns it. And nothing shows the falsity of the idea that Moore knows these things even if his own avowal fails.

(Moore 1; Wittgenstein 1; Malcolm 0)

References

Malcolm, N. (1982) ‘Wittgenstein: The relation of language to instinctive behaviour’ Philosophical Investigations, 5: 3-22

Wednesday, 19 May 2021

Getting no further, 10 years later, with Charles Travis ‘A sense of occasion’

Nearly ten years ago, I wrote a summary of Charles Travis’ utterly fascinating 2005 paper ‘A sense of occasion’. Although I was able to follow the bulk of the argument and, despite the passage of time, I hold by and large with my 2012 reading of it, I failed to follow the key argument in the penultimate section.

Sadly, I still cannot. I do not understand how occasion sensitivity can do for knowledge what it does for Lac Leman’s being blue. I cannot work out what my blind-spot is. It ought to be obvious.

So I’ll start where I left off ten years ago. This is where I become too stupid.

Max speaks truth in saying there might be goats. The truth he speaks is that there might be, on a certain understanding of something’s being what might be: what one ought to understand by this on this occasion. Again, if there is occasion-sensitivity, then there are not, in addition to such facts as to what might be when one understands might be in this or that way, further facts as to what might be anyway, occasion-insensitively. It is facts of the first kind, and not such supposed further facts, that bear on the truth of knowledge ascriptions, different ones on different ascriptions. Where Sid does not know, he is not to be treated as authoritative; where he does, he is. That rule applies equally in Pia’s situation and in Max’s. There is no difficulty in the idea that some people, engaging with the world in given ways, ought to treat Sid as an authority while others, engaged in other ways, ought not – even if the latter cannot recognize what the former ought to do.
Max ought not to treat Sid as an authority. For he ought to treat goats behind the barn as a way things might be. If he does so treat it, he will see what Pia said as indifferent to a possibility. But what Pia’s statement is indifferent to is what might be on a certain understanding of what might be. It need not thereby be indifferent to any way things might be, on that understanding of might be which its occasion calls for. (Nor is that more than Max, on his occasion, can recognize consistently.) So it need not be understood as crediting Sid with any status he might enjoy despite the existence of possibilities that he is wrong. It may be crediting him with a status he can only enjoy in having proof he grasps as proof. What may vary from one occasion to another (from Max’s, say, to Pia’s) is what would count as enjoying that.
What, if right, would demonstrate occasion-sensitivity is this. For us, both Pia’s occasion and Max’s may be fully in view. We can see all that would make things count one way on the one occasion, another on the other – if the relevant notions are occasion-sensitive. If there is not occasionsensitivity, then at most one of these occasions exhibits the facts as they really are. For there are then only occasion-insensitive facts as to what (really) might be, no matter what else passes for that on one occasion or the other. So either it really might be that there are goats behind the barn, or, really, that is not a way things might be, punkt. So which is it? What Austin and I think is that this question has no motivated answer. Nothing in the way things are gives the one answer any better credentials than the other as an answer to the question what (really) might be. If we are right, and if the point holds, not just for goats behind the barn, but reasonably systematically, then there can be no facts about what might be (or surely not enough) if those facts are not occasion-sensitive ones. That is always the mainspring of occasion-sensitivity. I think it is easy to confirm in the case at hand. [ibid: 308-9]

Let’s assume that both sheep and some goats bleat. Sid can recognise bleats from other noises that animals make (barks, tweets) and lives in a sheep-only environment. Thus when he hears a bleat, it is a sheep bleat and he can tell a bleat from a bark, say. Hearing bleating from the barn, does he know there are sheep in there?

Pia can see the barn and where Sid is standing, listening. As far as she is concerned, she can hear sheep bleating in the barn. She thinks she knows that there are sheep in the barn and she ascribes that knowledge to Sid. Perhaps she hears Sid say aloud: “Lo, the sound of sheep bleating from the barn.”

(One possibility mentioned by Travis is that she can acquire knowledge that there are sheep by hearing what Sid says and knowing that Sid can tell a sheep by its noise even if she cannot. She might be a consumer of his knowledge rather than having equal standing.)

As a variant, she walks round the barn simply for exercise, seeing, by chance, that there are no creatures behind it. This does not change her ascription. (Obviously, there’s a point to this, below.)

Max can see and hear everything that Pia can. Standing next to Sid he refuses to ascribe knowledge or even a true belief to Sid. But, as in the variant above, once he has walked round the barn, he thinks that what Sid says is true but, despite this, he does not ascribe *knowledge* to Sid. Although he does think that Sid *thinks* he knows that there are sheep in the barn (that Sid’s saying “Lo, the sound of sheep” is supposed to be expressive of knowledge) and although he thinks that this is true because he, Max, thinks that he, Max, knows that there are sheep in the barn (again possibly, ironically, partly because of what Sid himself says) still Sid’s true belief is merely lucky. It doesn’t amount to knowledge. Why? Well see a bit later.

With this in place, I will go back to Travis’ famous example of Lac Leman being blue and assume in parallel that Pia says it is, because it looks very blue as it reflects the sky, whereas water-scientist Max says that, unlike other lakes nearby, there are no alluvial deposits shading it blue and so it is not blue on his understanding. (A bucket of it would not look blue.) In this case, it seems possible to contextualise both Pia and Max and to agree that what they both said was true in the way that they were thinking of being blue. If someone - a philosopher - were to press the question of whether it was ‘really’ blue, we might have to clarify context and perhaps adopt one use or other but in general it would seem the wrong question to ask, something of a non-sequitur. (The existing full story already shows how it is blue in one sense and not blue in another and whether one sense seems more important is a practical, not a philosophical, matter.)

(Travis suggests that a philosopher asking whether someone *really* knows is equally otiose.)

So let’s go back to the knowledge case. Can we run the same contextualising form of interpretation and arrive at a view whereby both Pia and Max are right to say, although on different understanding of what they are saying, that Sid does know (ie Pia) and that he does not (ie Max)? 

I’m struggling to do this.

Since both Pia and Max think (on the variant) - correctly - that Sid has a true belief about the sheep, the difference is in the third condition on knowledge. (I assume I can speak this way even without thinking that there is an informative sufficient analysis of knowledge. Still, putative knowledge is undermined by luck as Gettier stresses.) So let’s fill out a context for Max. 

Perhaps Max knows that goats have recently been introduced to the neighbourhood and tend to try to steal food through the rear walls of sheep barns. Since Sid has not checked behind the barn, he does not know that there are no goats - though, in the variant, Max can see that there are no goats - and so Sid does not know that the bleating is sheep bleating. It might have been that there were goats instead and that is enough to undermine an ascription of knowledge to Sid. Max does not ascribe even true belief to Sid until he has himself looked round the barn because he does not think that he himself knows there are sheep until he has done this. For Max, the variant case is necessary even to ascribe true belief to Sid (and to self-ascribe knowledge) that there are sheep in the barn.

In the natural reading of the initial set-up - before we conjured up the food-stealing goats - Pia seemed right to ascribe knowledge to Sid on the grounds that he could hear the bleating and no goats had been mentioned (and in the variant Pia could see there were none, even if Sid could not). But with the new context in play, then it seems that Max would deny Pia knowledge until she walked round the barn. In her first view of things, she neglected a real possibility. And according to Max, Sid always neglects this possibility because there might have been goats and he didn’t (timelessly: doesn’t) check this (as, in the variant, Pia does). So, according to Max, Pia was wrong to ascribe knowledge to Sid even when, after walking round the barn, she was right to self-ascribe knowledge.

Unlike the Lac Leman case, I struggle to find a context pertaining to what ‘might have been’ such that both Pia and Max were right to take their different views of Sid’s knowledge status. 

How about this? Max is sensitive to a merely recent incursion of foreign goats, upsetting the long-standing sheep-only balance of nature. That is why he thinks that there might have been goats behind the barn. Perhaps, however, whether or not the incursion had happened, the goats would never have tolerated the thin atmosphere of this high altitude barn. Knowing this further fact, Pia does not even need to walk round it to rule out goats and can thus know (even before the variant) that the bleating implies sheep and hence Sid knows that there are sheep. 

The problem with this is that it seems that it undermines Max’s view of things. Although he does think it, Max is *wrong* to think that there might have been goats behind the barn. Pia *knows* that there could not be. Thus Sid’s reliance on the sound of bleating was sufficient for Sid to know that there were sheep in the barn. This is one possibility. Pia is right about Sid and Max is wrong about Sid.

Perhaps not, however. Max may take the view that although *Pia* knows about the effects of altitude on goats and he, Max, - obviously (since he is a water-scientist in the other case) - does too, Sid hasn’t explored goat respiration with sufficient attention to count as a knower. Sid’s assumption that there are no goats, while as it happens reliable, is, in Max’s view as far as Sid goes, merely a matter of luck. Max does not think that Sid is epistemically responsible. Max thinks that the fact, and the exclusion of goat-ringers, is outside Sid’s ken. What might have been is brutely external to Sid’s thinking. Etc, etc. But, again, if Max is right, then Pia is wrong.

So this still seems different to the Lac Leman case. Imagine that Max and Pia have a conversation about the goat respiration angle. She stresses that no goat could dwell at that altitude; he says that while that seems to be the latest science, it is hot off the presses and Sid would have had no right to rely on it even had he given it any thought unless he did more than glance at the Daily Mail headlines. There does not seem to be a Bernard Williams absolute conception style representation that redeems both of their apparently opposing views. Either they will continue to disagree or one view will win out.

There does not seem to be any clear but equivalent uses here of what ‘might have been the case’ akin to the equivalent cases of what sort of ‘blue’ one meant when one said the Lake was blue. Max and Pia may rationally disagree on what, actually as it were, might have been the case. That may be enough to suggest that there is no fact of the matter and hence no fact of the matter as to knowledge status. But there does not seem room for disagreement on the use or contextual meaning of ‘what might have been the case’ here such that, from yet another perspective, both parties can be easily understood to be speaking the truth when - apparently - saying the opposite thing. (The point being: in the Lac Leman case, they are not saying the opposite thing despite using the same English sentence.)

Tuesday, 11 May 2021

Danièle Moyal-Sharrock on Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty

Back in 2009, I wrote a very brief outline of Danièle Moyal-Sharrock’s 2007 book Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (Moyal-Sharrock 2007). I think my summary (though very inadequate) wasn’t false. So today I want to offer some sort of assessment in the light of other things I’ve read about Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (OC) more recently.

According to Moyal-Sharrock, Wittgenstein held bipolarity to be a necessary condition for propositions... 

(Bipolarity: every proposition must be capable of being true and capable of being false. It is more restrictive than bivalence: every proposition is either true or false. Thus only something that could be true and could be false counts as a proposition. So, in the context of the later Wittgenstein as usually described (the second Wittgenstein for Moyal-Sharrock), grammatical prescriptions, which set out conditions for playing particular language games (there is no such thing as reddish green; pink is lighter than red; 2 + 2 = 4), cannot be false and thus do not count as propositions. To put it that way is to mislead, however, – sorry! – because neither are they true. At this point, some commentators are happier to say that they are true in a minimal or surd manner.) 

... The expression of a hinge - in a hinge like context, not an empirical doppelgänger - cannot be false. And so it cannot be a proposition. And hence, in a technical sense, it is nonsense (which is not to say anything value-laden about it!). Nevertheless, even in such a context, a rational speaker must be able to appreciate the semantic relations of the whole to its parts and those parts to other genuine propositions with sense. All this is in her book.

Assuming that knowledge is limited to contents expressible as propositions (or, perhaps, contents that simply are propositions) then this non-propositional reading of hinges quickly and directly rules out their being known. Moore does not know the thingy he tries to express in his claim which, were one to overhear it in a crowded bar, one might have taken to concern whether he has a hand - in the non-medical context in which that seemed so sure that it was also proof against scepticism - because there isn’t anything ‘there’ in logical space to be known. He no more knows it than he knows that iggle wiggle piggle.

Now tautologies are not propositions either. And they too are related via semantic decomposition and recomposition to empirical, bipolarity-possessing propositions. And yet, someone who knows the truth of a tautology does not thereby know any worldly content. Suppose they know that a particular tautology is true. Apply Dummett’s worry about modest theories of meaning (that there is more to knowing a truth than knowing that it is true and knowledge of meaning requires the former). Can they know, not only that it is true, but its truth? Well perhaps in this derivative sense. They may know enough of the compositional structure of the tautology to know why it is a tautology. In a first year logic exam, this knowledge might be tested. So perhaps this does serve as an analogy for combining the idea that hinges are nonsensical and the idea that a rational speaker must grasp their relations to related bi-polar propositions.

Still, it would be an odd analogy (the fault is mine, not Moyal-Sharrock’s but I’m searching for a way to understand her view). Clicking the final pieces of the tautology into place stops it saying anything specific about the world (even if a competent self conscious speaker can explain how the structure yields the tautology). By contrast, Moore’s utterance looks still to have a location in logical space. It looks to link Moore and his hand, presupposing some English words, in a way that also provides a competent speaker the wherewithal to recognise that a doppelgänger sentence is not using any of the words ambiguously or as metaphor or merely in secondary sense. A doppelgänger is, indeed, a doppelgänger of the hinge itself. (Just to be clear: I am warming up to the idea that we know the content of a hinge - thus that it has a content - by taking our ability to construct the right, relevant doppelgänger as one indication. Our selection of the doppelgänger implies we know where, in logical space, to look.)

(This makes me wonder what the non-proposition ‘thingy’ (I’d write ‘content’ but it cannot be that; let ‘thingy’ stand in) of the hinge is, for Moyal-Sharrock. It must be something like the use of the sentence in that context. Used in the doppelgänger context, it is a different thing: a successful bi-polar proposition. So it cannot be just the sentence or character string. The words are not sufficient for the thingy. It must be the sentence in use. But given that it is supposed to fail of a use in the hinge context, my phrase “the use of the sentence in that context” must nevertheless be wrong. So of what is the doppelgänger a doppelgänger? Surely, again not the mere sentence or character string, since a synonymous doppelgänger using different words would also be a doppelgänger. (So the very words are not even necessary for the hinge: synonymous ones would do for both hinge and doppelgänger.) It is as though we need to postulate more than the sentence or character string but less than a proposition: a sort of nonsensical sense to serve as the basic vehicle from which doppelgängers can then be constructed. But that seems utter rubbish! This is, I fear, the consequence of starting to use the idea of nonsense as a technical notion.)

To return to the analogy with tautology. It seems much odder to say of the hinge - than the tautology - that it does not gesture at a particular bit of logical space. Its content has not been cancelled out in the way that that of a tautology has.

I have the impression that Moyal-Sharrock has provided a move in the history of ideas - in this case the specifics of Wittgenstein’s use of ‘proposition’ - rather than a contribution to epistemology (even in the meta-tradition of ending it). Once the notion of nonsense has become merely technical - such that we can say what the connection is between hinges, related empirical propositions and doppelgängers - it no longer provides illumination for why Moore’s claim to know his ‘hinge’ fails. I think that we do at least seem to know / understand what it is - what logical possibility - Moore thinks he knows: namely that ‘this’ (ie that that) is (was) a hand. So the content seems specified: that that was his hand. We might sniffily say that this is technically nonsense – well not that sniffily as ‘nonsense’ is not a value term – but we no longer have a grasp of why this isn’t a content that might be known.

Given this, then the failure of Moore to know it falls back from the stark idea that there is nothing to know to the more modest idea that there is a (quasi- or non-Wittgensteinian-propositional) content but that it is just that he doesn’t know it. His attitude is different. Perhaps he lacks the right justification? He might have a different attitude to it, one of animal certainty, and perhaps that it is a task of OC to describe.

And I think that this does seem to be a plausible reading of some of what Moyal-Sharrock says. Surely over strongly, she claims that Wittgenstein subscribes to a JTB analysis of knowledge (nothing she cites warrants this, though she does cite context specific connections to justification) and then suggests that certainties are not justified. One does not offer a reason for them. I can imagine that one could draw a distinction between knowledge and certainty this way. But if so it would be premised on a philosophical analysis of knowledge - which isn’t Wittgenstein’s usual mode - and the idea that knowledge works only that way (ie that the analysis is a good reduction). Perhaps: that there is always an explicit justification for any knowledge claim. But it seems to me to be equally plausible to say that while knowledge is a standing in the space of reasons, not every knowledge claim is advanced on the basis of a reason and in some cases offering a reason if challenged would be sketching an almost entire world picture. What is the justification for denying the chronology of young earth creationism? Well it’s not any one compelling factoid. But still, I think we know that the Earth is more than 6,000 years old.

Overall, I don't think that the non-propositional, ‘nonsensical’ reading of hinges works as a free standing response to any epistemological worries we may have.  

Moyal-Sharrock, D (2007) Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Thursday, 6 May 2021

Some notes on having a nervous breakdown

I didn’t much like 2020. Just before it started, I found myself having a deep gash stitched on Christmas Eve (2019) in A&E. (One gets such a sinking feeling on realising that one really will require medical attention at such a time of year!) Then I developed a painful neuroma, as a result of five hours of standing teaching, which stopped all thoughts of exercise for a few months. But then Covid-19 hit and everything else seemed unimportant. I ‘saw’ in the denuded shelves of Asda in March, one Sunday morning when I am normally pretty much alone in the shop, the likely end of civilisation. We were led by a government of corrupt idiots at a time when much more was needed.

But 2021 started worse when I was forced to commit a kind of career suicide by declaring to all concerned that I could no longer work. The attacks of anxiety, the retching and vomiting, had spread through the week even to the weekends and I was ‘done in’. Various important things had to be finished, or so it seemed, but equally I couldn’t go on. And so I borrowed a few days of energy to finish some tasks and delegate others (to generous and understanding colleagues) and then walked away from work one Monday morning. ‘Walked’ is wrong. I pretty much fell onto the sofa and didn’t get up for a month. Three months later, I’m still weak as a kitten.

Since my memory seems affected, I just want to scribble some notes and there’s less chance I’ll lose them if I put them on the web.

I want to say that I’ve had a ‘nervous breakdown’ because that best balances the rational exogenous causes with the internal madness and collapse. But ‘really’ it’s GAD and depression. The latter started in 2015 or 16, a year or so after the death of my parents. Grief segued into depression. This surprised me because, despite myself, I’d let grief take its course. If, like a wave, it swamped me in a rough Liverpool pub and I ended up weeping like a child, so be it. Nor was there any corrupting guilt in the mix. We’d all done the very best by each other in that final year. And yet something went wrong. I spent much of my time fleeing the world by retiring to bed and drifting into sleep. I became worried at the boundaries of the bedroom. My safe world shrank to one room and then to under the duvet.

At some point, I realised I’d lost happiness in two quite specific ways. I was never struck by happiness any more. Never, walking in the sun up to pick up a newspaper and flirt a little with the station buffet staff, did I think: Gosh I’m happy! Second, I could never anticipate happiness. I might know – purely cognitively - on a Wednesday morning that it was likely I’d be happy in the pub on Friday, but I didn’t get to experience a foretaste of that happiness in advance. And that made dark work-day mornings rather bleak. I could never feel any happiness in advance. The belief I had in future prospects was pure belief. Not affect. This ‘anhedonia’ continues though sometimes I wonder whether I can feel a little more, like hearing returning after a noisy gig. (Am I happy in flow activity? I’m inclined to say yes, like a cat. It would be wrong to say I wasn't happy when, say, talking or teaching. It’s just that I cannot feel that I am.)

Anxiety began to grow as the Cumbrian autumnal darkness arrived (this had happened in 2019, too). Somatised as nausea and retching, I’d learned to live with this as a localised once or twice a week ‘attack’. I could cycle across Preston retching as I went merely feeling embarrassed and stupid. But it began to spread through the week as a constant feeling of dread and my body decided that since I just ignored the retching it would sometimes, playfully, unpredictably, up the stakes to vomiting. Perhaps this is what was so tiring over time, though I didn’t notice so much that I was exhausted until this year. Even as I arranged sickness leave, I didn’t spot the physical aspect of the mental illness until I was permitted to give in to it. From the first Monday I was off, I was unable to do anything. My fond thought of three months of pottering and philosophy was replaced by the most tedious of incapacity. 

I realise that my image of a nervous breakdown came from reading Saul Bellow’s novel Herzog. The titular Herzog has been left by his wife, rather cruelly, and retires from life to write letters. For example, to Heidegger. “Dear Doktor Professor Heidegger, I should like to know what you mean by the expression ‘the fall into the quotidian’. When did this fall occur? Where were we standing when it happened?” I thought I’d be able to maintain some sort of inquiring mind and write experientially grounded philosophy as a catharsis. I could study my own illness but at one remove. This immediately proved a ridiculous hope.

After a little while I decided to come off the second of the SSRIs I’d recently tried (the third of the illness as a whole). Coming off Paroxetine in a hurry turned out to be a form of ‘cold turkey’. Quite physically unpleasant. But also, as I slowly recovered, I realised just how much madder I had been. Being emotionally out of sync with the world had been like living in a mildly disturbed dream for a few weeks but I’d only occasionally realised that I was dreaming. Strange that I’d not noticed the loss of sanity, only its return (cf dreaming scepticism disjunctivism). 

As a philosopher with a particular cognitivist bent - language, thought, and intentionality being guiding interests - I’d always assumed that madness was only really a matter of what Jaspers calls ‘primary delusions’, belief-like states that strain their belief-status, are hard for others to make sense of, and occur only with particularly severe forms of mental illness. But madness is also a matter of doing, saying and feeling as well as pure reasoning. To begin with, I was obviously tearfully distressed. Phone calls, even a couple of initial reassuring calls from managers, left me attempting to press the phone into the duvet as though trying to get rid of it by submerging it. More generally, because the whole mood of the world was wrong, so was I. One evening my partner photographed me watching some trivial television programme. I was upside down with my head on the ground, the small of my back against the seat of the sofa and my legs resting up its back. I’d been like that for an hour and hadn’t noticed. Basic norms of comportment would normally have indicated to me that this was, at the very least, unusual and hardly comfortable. Self respect might have made me offer a reason to my beloved. But none of this occurred to me. The picture now makes me feel a little sick just as one might feel if one realises one wishes to turn away from a dying sheep found on a hillside.

One evening everything seemed so wrong and strange that my partner darkened the room, stoked the stove, and left a long slow piece by Max Richter playing hugely loudly on the hi fi, filling the room as though to exclude everything else from the space. It calmed me but also contaminated Richter for me afterwards. I no longer play him.

I’m returning to working now. I don't know whether it is too soon but it seems right to try. Perhaps nothing will improve very soon whatever I do. My anxiety is no better - on the morning I reviewed my email inbox, I vomited on my study carpet, having forgotten the usual safeguards - but I seem to know more fundamentally that it is irrational. My energy levels are poor. But while I don’t have the energy to be out on the hills, I no longer fear the outdoors. I could imagine being better. It doesn’t seem likely right now. But it doesn’t seem impossible as it did a few weeks ago.

There is a postscript here.